Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities

Koplin, Julian

doi:10.1002/hast.1051

Cited by 19 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The others state that chimeric organisms containing human cells cannot turn into humans and therefore will not affect human dignity. They also argue that the humanlike features imparted to chimeras will neither affect the biological environment nor the moral status of animals and will never reach human consciousness (Koplin, 2019;Degrazia, 2019).…”

Section: Generation Of Chimeric Animals For Organ Transplantationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bioethical issues in genome editing by CRISPR-Cas9 technology

Ayanoğlu¹,

Elçin²,

Elçin³

2020

Turk J Biol

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Biology and function of CRISPR-Cas9 technologyGenome editing technologies often work by creating fractures in chromosomal DNA. ZFN, TALEN, and CRISPR-Cas9 are all based solely on nucleases (Kim and Kim, 2014;Roh et al., 2018). The strength of these technologies stems from the ability to create fractures in the desired region of a specific target sequence as determined by the researcher. This allows researchers to modify the genome in practice in any region (Memi et al., 2018).The creation of changes in the genome depends mainly on the DNA repair capacity of the cells (Lau et al., 2018). All cells have two basic mechanisms for the repair of doubleAbstract: Genome editing technologies have led to fundamental changes in genetic science. Among them, CRISPR-Cas9 technology particularly stands out due to its advantages such as easy handling, high accuracy, and low cost. It has made a quick introduction in fields related to humans, animals, and the environment, while raising difficult questions, applications, concerns, and bioethical issues to be discussed. Most concerns stem from the use of CRISPR-Cas9 to genetically alter human germline cells and embryos (called germline genome editing). Germline genome editing leads to serial bioethical issues, such as the occurrence of undesirable changes in the genome, from whom and how informed consent is obtained, and the breeding of the human species (eugenics). However, the bioethical issues that CRISPR-Cas9 technology could cause in the environment, agriculture and livestock should also not be forgotten. In order for CRISPR-Cas9 to be used safely in all areas and to solve potential issues, worldwide legislation should be prepared, taking into account the opinions of both life and social scientists, policy makers, and all other stakeholders of the sectors, and CRISPR-Cas9 applications should be implemented according to such legislations. However, these controls should not restrict scientific freedom. Here, various applications of CRISPR-Cas9 technology, especially in medicine and agriculture, are described and ethical issues related to genome editing using CRISPR-Cas9 technology are discussed. The social and bioethical concerns in relation to human beings, other organisms, and the environment are addressed.

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Section: Generation Of Chimeric Animals For Organ Transplantationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bioethical issues in genome editing by CRISPR-Cas9 technology

Ayanoğlu¹,

Elçin²,

Elçin³

2020

Turk J Biol

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“…In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Julian Koplin focuses on experiments that both create human-animal chimeras, especially those with human brain cells, and experiments that use (or plan to use) such animals to better study various diseases and treatments. 1 The moral status of humananimal chimeras that have human brain cells is especially concerning.…”

Section: Other Voicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How should we think about chimeras’ moral status? As Julian Koplin notes in his insightful article in this issue of the Hastings Center Report , many commentators assume that we should ask whether a new chimeric creature would possess (hitherto) uniquely human cognitive capacities . Koplin's chief contribution to the debate on this topic is to argue persuasively that the “humanness” of a creature's cognitive capacities is, in itself, irrelevant to its moral status.…”

Section: Other Voicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human‐Animal Chimeras, “Human” Cognitive Capacities, and Moral Status

DeGrazia¹

2019

Hastings Center Report

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In “Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities,” Julian Koplin explores a promising way of thinking about moral status. Without attempting to develop a model in any detail, Koplin picks up Joshua Shepherd's interesting proposal that we think about moral status in terms of the value of different kinds of conscious experience. For example, a being with the most basic sort of consciousness and sentience would have interests that matter morally, while a being whose consciousness featured the riches of loving affection, say, might have greater moral status and therefore deserve some sort of priority if the interests of the two beings conflicted. This approach represents an improvement over the more common, transparently anthropocentric habits of thinking about moral status, whether in connection with evaluating human‐animal chimera research, deciding what one can ethically eat, or pursuing some other moral inquiry.

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“…To answer this question, we need to take into consideration not only the way an experiment impacts the animal (for example, the kind and duration of suffering the animal endures or the goods the animal is prevented from experiencing due to the shortening of its life) and the human benefits gained but also what the moral status of the animal experimented on is. In this issue of the Hastings Center Report , Julian Koplin focuses on experiments that both create human‐animal chimeras, especially those with human brain cells, and experiments that use (or plan to use) such animals to better study various diseases and treatments . The moral status of human‐animal chimeras that have human brain cells is especially concerning.…”

Section: Other Voicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Moral Status of Human‐Animal Chimeras with Human Brain Cells

Tannenbaum¹

2019

Hastings Center Report

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While there is not unanimity (across time or cultures), almost all who read this commentary will think that both they and a toddler have a moral status higher than that of a rat. For instance, they will think that a third party who has to choose whom to save from death should choose them over the rat, and the toddler over the rat. But what is it about humans that gives us this greater moral status? This question is particularly pressing when considering that scientists have begun creating human‐animal chimeras with brains composed partly or wholly of human cells. In “Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities,” Julian Koplin focuses on the moral implications of such experiments and those that use (or plan to use) these chimeras to study diseases and treatments. How should we understand the concerns about moral status that have been raised about such chimeras? In this commentary, I interpret these concerns differently from Koplin and respond to his suggestion that the greater one's ability to draw value from certain kinds of conscious experiences, the greater one's moral status.

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Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities

Cited by 19 publications

References 34 publications

Bioethical issues in genome editing by CRISPR-Cas9 technology

Bioethical issues in genome editing by CRISPR-Cas9 technology

Human‐Animal Chimeras, “Human” Cognitive Capacities, and Moral Status

The Moral Status of Human‐Animal Chimeras with Human Brain Cells

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