hroot: Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool

Bock, Olaf; Baetge, Ingmar; Nicklisch, Andreas

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.07.003

Cited by 625 publications

(369 citation statements)

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“…The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants were invited using hroot (Bock, Baetge et al 2014). Participants never learned with which other participant they interacted.…”

Section: Post-experimental Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

Bar‐Gill

Engel

2016

The Journal of Law and Economics

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Section: Post-experimental Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

Bar‐Gill

Engel

2016

The Journal of Law and Economics

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“…A total of 240 subjects participated in the experiment and they were recruited via h-root (Bock et al, 2014). Sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes and the average payment per subject was €19.02.…”

Section: Ambiguous Number Of Winners (Ambiguous)mentioning

confidence: 99%

How Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Tournaments Affect Gender Differences in Competitive Behavior

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractTournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but where the number of winners is either uncertain (i.e., unknown numbers of winners, but known probabilities) or ambiguous (unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions with a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in performance of men, while we observe no change for women. Both men and women increase their willingness to enter competition with uncertainty and ambiguity, but men react slightly more than women. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, previous experiments on gender differences in competition may have measured a lower bound of differences between men and women.

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“…This has two implications. First, the number of periods of exclusion is no longer unique; it is restricted to the interval 12 Imposing either the unanimity or the majority voting rule regardless of the group size would have been a concern because it would have imposed different requirements to exclude someone according to the group size. 13 We chose this procedure to avoid having no risk of sanction in three periods whereas severe sanctions were available in the previous periods.…”

Section: Endo Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A total of 208 participants were recruited via HRoot (Bock et al, 2014) mainly among students from local engineering, business and medical schools. No subject participated in more than one session.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Soldà

Villeval

2017

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. Keywords:Ostracism, exclusion, reintegration, cooperation, experiment JEL codes:C92, H41, D23 Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social DilemmaAlice Solda and Marie Claire Villeval April 24, 2018 AbstractUsing a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. JEL-Code: C92, H41, D23

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hroot: Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool

Cited by 625 publications

References 1 publication

Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment

How Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Tournaments Affect Gender Differences in Competitive Behavior

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

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