How We Hurt The Ones We Love

Abstract

Paradoxically, the practical necessity of love seems to combine the personal character of psychological necessity with the inescapable and authoritative quality of moral necessity. Traditionally, philosophers have avoided this paradox by treating love as an amalgam of impersonal evaluative judgments and affective responses. On my account, love participates in a different form of practical necessity, one characterized by a non‐moral yet normative type of expectation. This expectation is best understood as a kind of second‐personal address that does not support derivative third‐personal demands. It is revealed when we react with hurt feelings instead of resentment upon its disappointment.

Kant on Sex. Reconsidered. -- A Kantian account of sexuality: sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation

“…5 For a Kantian example, see Allais (2008aAllais ( , 2008bAllais ( , 2008cAllais ( , 2013. 6 For Kantian examples, see Albrecht (2015) and Sussman (2005). I consider this paper one way to do what these articles by Albrecht, Allais, and Sussman do not view themselves as doing, namely engaging Kant's texts to show how his own theory can address these issues.…”