Al is nearly finished sweeping his kitchen floor when he notices, on a counter, a corkscrew that should be put in a drawer. He intends to put the corkscrew away as soon as he is finished with the floor; but by the time he returns the broom and dustpan to the closet, he has forgotten what he intended to do. Al knows (or has a true belief) that there is something he intended to do now in the kitchen. He gazes around the room and tries to recall what it was. Within a minute or so, without seeing the corkscrew, Al recalls. He puts the corkscrew away.Did Al have an intention to put the corkscrew away that persisted from the time he acquired the intention until he put the corkscrew away? That is one of my guiding questions in this article. Perhaps surprisingly, an attempt to come to grips with it leads quickly to some largely uncharted territory in the philosophy of mind and action. Although considerable attention has been paid to nonoccurrent beliefs and desires, little attention has been paid to nonoccurrent intentions; and apparent differences between occurrent and nonoccurrent intentions, as I will explain, bear directly on my question about Al and the corkscrew.To make things more manageable than they would otherwise be, I make three assumptions. First, intentions exist. Second, anyone who intends to A has an intention to A.