How to silence the lambs? Constructing authoritarian governance in post-transitional Hungary

Abstract

This paper examines a range of arguments put forward to explain how financial surveillance of non-governmental organisations empowers authoritarianism in the post-transitional Hungarian context. In doing so, it attempts to shed light on the limitations of existing surveillance theories regarding the historical component of surveillance tolerance and the different modes of governance in post-communist European countries. It argues that post-transitional disappointment in democratic governance is causing Hungarians to become resigned to political decisions and to support new forms of authoritarian rules. Such a stoic attitude and the historically embedded surveillance culture facilitate the use of monitoring mechanisms that not only target terrorists as an external security threat, but also target NGOs defined as 'the enemies of national values'. Hungarian authoritarian policies are not facilitated by extended surveillance practices, as Anglo-Saxon theories have regularly argued, but by the way they are used as an instrument of a political deterrence strategy against political opponents.

The militarization of digital surveillance in post-coup Zimbabwe: ‘Just don’t tell them what we do’

“…Postcolonial Zimbabwe, however, has not produced institutions capable of constraining military encroachment into civilian private spaces. Nagy (2017: 453) makes similar observations about post-transitional Hungary, establishing that ‘extended surveillance practices . .…”

Исследования Надзора: Основные Направления И Теоретические Подходы

“…Несмотря на объявленную частью ученых неактуальность акцента на правительственной слежке, публикации, посвященные государственному надзору, продолжают составлять значительную долю всех работ в рассматриваемой области. Среди них выделяются исследования, посвященные надзору за обществом в целом [Siqueira Cassiano, 2019;Binder, 2017;Bozzini, 2017;Ogasawara, 2017;Bauman et al, 2014;Topal, 2005], государственной слежке за оппозиционными политиками, партиями и движениями [Fonseca, 2017;Hargreaves, 2017;Nagy, 2017;Pearce, 2015], наблюдению за отдельными социальными группами, считающимися «подозрительными» [Alimahomed- Wilson, 2018;Qurashi, 2018;Monaghan, 2014;Wilson, Weber, 2008], полицейскому надзору и надзору специальных служб [Egbert, Leese, 2020;Fussey, Sandhu, 2020;Bigo, Bonelli, 2019;Stan, Zulean, 2018;Shan, McQuade, 2017], надзору в области здравоохранения, образования и социального обеспечения [Liu, Bennett, 2020;Dee, 2013;Maki, 2011;Bryce et al, 2010].…”

The Art of Screening: Reasonable Efforts and Measures at the Nexus of Aid Work and Counterterrorism

“…Indeed, aid NGOs are not only subject to surveillance as bank clients but also may be criminalized or securitized as foreign agents. While Muslim charities traditionally have been considered suspicious in Western countries (Malakoutikhah 2020), certain governments-in Russia, Turkey, Israel (Lamarche 2019), and Hungary (Nagy 2017), among others-not only rhetorically labelled but also legally designated international and local NGOs as security risks, accusing them of threatening public order or "national values" (Human Rights Council 2019). Foreign and fellow local NGOs can also be surveilled by other NGOs, sort of "vigilante" organizations, such as the pro-Israeli NGO Monitor, which aims to demonstrate how civil society actors may contribute to funding Palestinian "terrorism" (Lamarche 2019).…”