How to share a function securely

Santis, Alfredo De; Desmedt, Yvo; Frankel, Yair; Yung, Moti

doi:10.1145/195058.195405

Cited by 224 publications

(126 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

126

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This is essentially the same definition as (t + 1, n)-secure function sharing primitive in [31]. [31] also showed how to implement such sharing with trapdoor permutations such as RSA.…”

Section: Definition 4 ((T + 1 N)-secure Sharing Scheme) Let F Be a mentioning

confidence: 92%

“…There are schemes based on both Diffie-Hellman problem [30] and RSA [31]. All these schemes can be shown to be secure against chosen plaintext attack, but they are not known to withstand chosen ciphertext attack.…”

Section: Threshold Decryption Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Theorem 1 provides security guarantee for constructing multicast encryption using any other assumptions. For example, [31] provides a threshold RSA scheme with CPA security. Such scheme can be used to construct a RSA-based CPA secure multicast cryptosystem.…”

Section: Theorem 1 (Security Inheritance) Let µ ∈ {Cp a Cca2} Givementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

How to Construct Multicast Cryptosystems Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

Duan

Canny

2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In this paper we present a general framework for constructing efficient multicast cryptosystems with provable security and show that a line of previous work on multicast encryption are all special cases of this general approach. We provide new methods for building such cryptosystems with various levels of security (e.g., IND-CPA, IND-CCA2). The results we obtained enable the construction of a whole class of new multicast schemes with guaranteed security using a broader range of common primitives such as OAEP. Moreover, we show that multicast cryptosystems with high level of security (e.g. IND-CCA2) can be based upon public key cryptosystems with weaker (e.g. CPA) security as long as the decryption can be securely and efficiently "shared". Our constructions feature truly constant-size decryption keys whereas the lengths of both the encryption key and ciphertext are independent of group size.

show abstract

“…This is essentially the same definition as (t + 1, n)-secure function sharing primitive in [31]. [31] also showed how to implement such sharing with trapdoor permutations such as RSA.…”

Section: Definition 4 ((T + 1 N)-secure Sharing Scheme) Let F Be a mentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Threshold Decryption Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How to Construct Multicast Cryptosystems Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

Duan

Canny

2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A threshold public key encryption system [14,16,13,19] is a public key system where the private key is distributed among n decryption servers so that at least k servers are needed for decryption. In a threshold encryption system an entity, called the combiner, has a ciphertext C that it wishes to decrypt.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public Key Threshold Encryption Without Random Oracles

Boneh

Boyen²,

Halevi³

2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

107

120

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Several Threshold Decryption schemes have been presented. One [lo] is based on the ElGamal cryptosystem [14], others [ll, 161 are based on RSA [30] and a "proven secure" one is presented in [8]. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these ideas in more details.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Traceability of Ciphertexts — Towards a Secure Software Key Escrow System

Desmedt

1995

Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’95

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The Law Enforcement Agency Field (LEAF), wliicli in Clipper is appended to the ciphertext, allows the Law Enforcement Agency to trace the sender and receiver. To prevent users of Clipper to delete t h e T,EAF, the Clipper decryption box will not decrypt if the correct LEAF is not present. Such a solution requires the implementation t o be tamperproof. In this paper we propose an alternative approach to achieve traceability. Our solution is based on the computational complexity of some well known problems in number theory. So, our scheme does not require a tamperproof implementation, nor a secret algorithm. Its applications extend beyond key escrow.

show abstract

How to share a function securely

Cited by 224 publications

References 26 publications

How to Construct Multicast Cryptosystems Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

How to Construct Multicast Cryptosystems Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack

Chosen Ciphertext Secure Public Key Threshold Encryption Without Random Oracles

Securing Traceability of Ciphertexts — Towards a Secure Software Key Escrow System

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About