How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation

Abstract

Unlike other political leaders, leaders coming to power through military coups face a dual legitimation challenge: they must justify not only why they should rule but also how they came to power. Little attention has been paid to how coup leaders solve this legitimacy deficit and even less to the audiences of this legitimation. We ask: why do some coup leaders legitimate their coups by holding elections while others do not? Counterintuitively, we argue that coup leaders who oust democratically elected leaders are less likely to hold elections, except when tied to US military aid. We test these hypotheses through a data set of military coup regimes from 1946 to 2014 and trace out mechanisms through case studies of the Nigerian coup of 1983 and the Egyptian coup of 2013. This argument provides a new explanation for the emergence of authoritarian elections and a new perspective on the international dimensions of dictatorship.

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

“…Thus, it is not necessary for the new regime to emphasize how different it is from the previous one by meting out severe punishment to the fallen dictator. Conversely, in the case of a coup d'état , the new regime faces an issue, in that its unconstitutional way of grabbing power requires justification (Beetham, 2013, p. 232; Grewal & Kureshi, 2019). Consequently, it punishes the fallen dictator to appease the public and secure legitimacy.…”

Between Coups and Election: Constitutional Engineering and Military Entrenchment in Sudan

“…In some cases, coup leaders directly participated in and won the elections while in others, coup leaders’ proxies achieved victory. Grewal and Kureshi (2019) find that coup leaders use elections to legitimise their rule, especially when tied to US military aid. These findings echo Houngnikpo's (2010: vii) pessimistic take on how African armies seemingly withdraw after coups, only to hold elections and win them.…”

“…Following a successful military coup, armed forces face the challenge of balancing a desired continuation or improvement of their interests with establishing a post-coup regime that is viewed as legitimate. Post-coup elections offer an important mechanism to provide ex-post legitimacy (Grewal and Kureshi, 2019). Militaries typically rule by decree in the immediate aftermath of coups, but increasingly pursue preferential legislative changes and the electoral success of preferred parties in order to enshrine their long-term strategic interests.…”

The Aftermath of Nigeria’s 2023 Presidential Elections and Its Impact on the Sub-region

“…However, given the strength of the Nigerian army on the one side, and the growing menace of Islamist terrorism on the other, this scenario is unlikely to happen. Yet, potential coup leaders within the army might use close relations with Moscow and try to establish a similar regime as in Mali after the 2021 coup d'état assisted by Russian mercenaries of the Wagner group since September 2021 (Grewal & Kureshi, 2018).…”