How to Disagree About Argument Schemes

Abstract

Argumentation theorists often disagree about which scheme best represents a given type of argument (e.g. argument by analogy, argument from authority, inference to the best explanation). Unfortunately, these theorists sometimes become involved in fruitless pseudodisagreement because they fail to perceive that their supposedly competing schemes are means for achieving different (but compatible) practical or theoretical goals. This paper explains some of the different purposes that an argument scheme may serve, and indicates how the relevant type of pseudodisagreement may be avoided.Résumé: Les théoriciens de l'argumentation sont souvent en désaccord sur le schéma qui représente le mieux un type donné d'argument (par exemple un argument par analogie, un argument fondé sur un appel à l'autorité, une inférence à la meilleure explication). Malheureusement, ces théoriciens s'impliquent parfois dans un pseudo-désaccord infructueux parce qu'ils ne perçoi-vent pas que leurs systèmes en soidisant concurrence sont des moyens d'atteindre des objectifs pratiques ou théoriques différents (mais compatibles).Cet article explique quelques-uns des différents objectifs d'un schéma d'argument et indique comment on peut éviter le type pertinent de pseudo-désaccord.

Queue‐jumping arguments

“…Relatedly, since not all queues are alike, evaluating queue‐jumping arguments in terms of a single, commonplace canonical queueing situation is likely to prove misleading. Moreover, there are rival treatments of analogy (Shecaira 2016, 501–2), but the best such scheme in general need not be the best for this very specific application. Lastly, there are commonalities between queue‐jumping arguments that a general scheme for analogy cannot be expected to capture.…”