How to design nuclear certifiable COTS-based ATE

Abstract

A nuclear certifiable tester was developed to replace the Re-Entry System Test Set (RSTS) for the MK12/12A Re-Entry Vehicle used on the Minuteman III ICBM. Design of the COTS-based nuclear certifiable tester presented challenges unique to ATE. This paper will discuss several issues associated with building a nuclear certifiable tester and meeting nuclear surety requirements based on COTS instrumentation. A major nuclear certification design driver is the constraint prohibiting erroneous application of stimuli to the Reentry System. Second, no single tester failure will cause the safety features of the RSTS to fail. To accomplish this level of protection, several aspects of U stimulus as well as internal ATE operation are constantly monitored. This monitoring requirement is the basis for several unique W I module designs. This paper addresses these and other major hardware and software nuclear certification requirements and constraints and their respective implementations.