How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Heller, C.-Philipp; Kübler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu

doi:10.1257/aer.20191204

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…This does not rule out the possibility that reductions in perceived wait time play some role. Indeed, in a setting where wait times are long, appointments may be even more effective, and the logistical challenges might be quite different (Hakimov et al 2021).…”

Section: Other Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Soft and hard commitment devices to increase HIV testing

Sterck,

Kerwin,

Derksen

et al. 2019

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials

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We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.

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Section: Other Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Soft and hard commitment devices to increase HIV testing

Sterck,

Kerwin,

Derksen

et al. 2019

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials

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show abstract

“…More recently, Courty (2019) proposes a simple mechanism to eliminate scalping in ticket resale. Hakimov et al (2021) model the existing first-come-first-served online booking system and propose an alternative batch system, which makes scalping unprofitable. One major difference between ticket-scalping and queue-scalping is that capacity in the former case is perishable whereas capacity in the latter is available on an ongoing basis.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Queue Scalping

Cui

Wang

Yang

2023

SpringerBriefs in Service Science

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In addition to line-sitting, queue-scalping is also widely witnessed in congestion-prone service systems. Unlike true customers, queue-scalpers have no interest in the service being offered and enter the queue with the pure intent to sell their spots. Different from the line-sitting whereby customers pay someone to stand in line on their behalf (Chap. 3), queue-scalping takes a make-to-stock (MTS) approach in that queue-scalpers perpetually circulate in the queue before the arrival of a client, so by the time a buying customer arrives, she can readily take a scalper’s spot and shorten her wait. Thus, its value proposition is waiting-time reduction. In contrast, line-sitting takes a make-to-order (MTO) approach in that a line-sitter joins the queue only after a client requests so, and therefore (unlike queue-scalping), line-sitting does not decrease clients’ wait time but alleviates their waiting costs by diverting them from an on-site queue to an off-site queue. We present a queue scalping model in this chapter. This chapter is based on Yang et al. (Manag Sci 67:6803–6821, 2021) and Wang and Wang (Oper Res Lett 49:485–491, 2021) where interested readers can find proofs of the findings shown in this chapter.

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“…10 Indeed, we might expect larger effect sizes, higher demand for appointments, and different logistical challenges in a setting where wait times are long (Hakimov et al 2021).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%