How to ascribe beliefs to animals

Abstract

In this article, we analyze and reject two versions of the content‐argument against animal beliefs, namely, the ontological argument from Davidson and the epistemological argument from Stich. One of the main defects of the strongest version of the argument is that it over‐intellectualizes belief ascriptions in humans and thus sets the comparative bar for belief ascriptions in animals too high. In the second part of the article, we develop a gradualist notion of belief which captures basic beliefs as well as Davidsonian linguistic beliefs, and we specify the conditions under which belief ascriptions to nonlinguistic animals are justified.

Conceptual recombination and stimulus-independence in non-human animals

“…Turning to this second possibility, many researchers working on animal cognition consider that we can attribute to some non-human animals purely descriptive or prescriptive mental states that go beyond their perceptual here-and-now. These may include different kinds of memories (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998;Schwartz & Evans, 2001;Keven, 2016), beliefs (Saidel, 2009;Andrews, 2015;Newen & Starzak, 2022), future expectations and plans (Mulcahy & Call, 2006;Osvath & Osvath, 2008;Janmaat et al, 2014), etc. However, we should keep in mind that creatures that recombine their concepts in a broad causal-counterfactual way will be capable of having these mental states only when facing adequate stimuli.…”

Illustrating continuity between linguistic and non-linguistic human communication and expression

“…Such abilities are needed for ostensive-inferential communication only in limited ways, and the relevant abilities are within the ken of all great ape species (Moore, , 2017a. Moreover, the development of uniquely human forms of metarepresentation seems to be languagedependent (Berio, 2021a(Berio, , 2021bGrosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 2017;Low, 2010;Moore, 2021) and acquired later than basic forms of beliefs (Newen & Starzak, 2020). Nor is what's missing in unenculturated great apes exclusively a matter of trust.…”

Knowledgeisbelief – and shaped by culture

“…Knowledge-how to swim can be mastered better or worse but does not amount to knowing a fact. By analogy, a wider notion of belief could be characterized as a minimally structured informational state that can be systematically connected to motivational states (see Newen & Starzak, 2020).…”