How to argue for pragmatic encroachment

Roeber, Blake

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1850-4

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…My argument also has advantages over a similar approach recently offered by Roeber (2020). Roeber argues against purism on the grounds that the purist cannot explain why, in certain paradigmatic ‘high-stakes’ cases, an agent should take a less risky option rather than pursuing known actual utility (2020: 2655–60).…”

Section: Upshotsmentioning

confidence: 71%

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Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

Fritz¹

2021

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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This essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.

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Section: Upshotsmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…Blake Roeber (2020: 2650, 2018: 173) sorts existing arguments for impurism, into ‘intuition-based arguments’ and ‘principle-based arguments’. The most prominent intuition-based argument for impurism is offered by Jason Stanley (2005).…”

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confidence: 99%

Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

Fritz¹

2021

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…17 Nor do I intend to use intuitive responses to any case-pairs to drive an argument for encroachment on emotion. I agree with Brown (2013) and Roeber (2020) that the most compelling arguments in favor of encroachment on belief do not rest primarily on intuitions about whether subjects have knowledge across high-stakes/low-stakes case-pairs. And I suspect that a similar point holds for encroachment on emotion.…”

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confidence: 65%

Encroachment on Emotion

Fritz

2022

Episteme

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This paper introduces a novel form of pragmatic encroachment: one that makes a difference to the status of emotion rather than the status of belief. I begin by isolating a distinctive standard in terms of which we can evaluate emotion – one sometimes called “subjective fittingness,” “epistemic justification,” or “warrant.” I then show how this standard for emotion could face a kind of pragmatic encroachment importantly similar to the more familiar encroachment on epistemic standards for belief. Encroachment on warranted emotion is a striking proposal that deserves attention. In fact, there are good reasons to think that encroachment on warranted emotion deserves to be considered the default view for those who already accept pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic status of belief. I support this parity claim by arguing for a principle that establishes a limited coordination between the conditions that warrant emotion and the conditions that justify belief.

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“…1 For prominent defenses of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge and rational belief, see e.g. Fantl & McGrath (2002;, Stanley (2005); Schroeder (2012a); Weatherson (2012); Ross & Schroeder (2014); Roeber (2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

Steglich‐Petersen

2022

Philosophical Books

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Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow, can depend not only on the person's evidence, but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as "pragmatic encroachment" on knowledge and rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism.The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. In §2, I introduce the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment. In §3, I introduce some of the difficulties facing explanations of pragmatic encroachment by discussing one of the main proposals for such an explanation, namely that of Mark Schroeder. In §4, I introduce my transmission-based version of epistemic instrumentalism, that I rely on to explain pragmatic encroachment in §5, where I also show how this explanation avoids the difficulties faced by Schroeder's account, and avoids commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism. §6 is a brief summary and conclusion. Pragmatic EncroachmentWe can introduce the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment by considering the sort of cases that are often taken to motivate it. 3 Here is a set of cases from Schroeder (2012a: 266-7), adapted from Stanley (2005) and DeRose (1992). Consider first Low Stakes: Low Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Hannah remembers the bank being open on Saturday morning a few weeks ago, so she says, 'Fortunately, it will be open tomorrow, so we can just come back.' In fact, Hannah is right -the bank will be open on Saturday. Many philosophers share the intuition that Hannah's belief that the bank will be open could plausibly be considered epistemically rational. Her memory of seeing the bank being open a few weeks ago (coupled with relevant background knowledge) seems sufficient epistemic reason for her to believe that the bank will be open. 4 But contrast now Low Stakes with High Stakes: High Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since their mortgage payment is due on Sunday, they have very little in their account, and they are on the brink3 Not all proponents of pragmatic encroachment base their arguments primarily on intuitions about cases such as these. For example, Fantl & McGrath (2007; argue that pragmatic encroachment follows from fallibilism about knowledge and ...

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How to argue for pragmatic encroachment

Cited by 9 publications

References 38 publications

Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism

Encroachment on Emotion

An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

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