How to Acquire a Concept

Margolis, Eric

doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00081

Cited by 163 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…5 For example, Margolis (1998) and Fodor (2008) acknowledge that stereotypes might be "sustaining mechanisms" involved in the acquisition and even application of concepts, but still deny that stereotypes are constituents of concepts. This same view was also defended in a very influential paper by Rey (1983).…”

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confidence: 99%

Dual Content Semantics, privative adjectives, and dynamic compositionality

Pinal

2015

S&P

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This paper defends the view that common nouns have a dual semantic structure that includes extension-determining and non-extensiondetermining components. I argue that the non-extension-determining components are part of linguistic meaning because they play a key compositional role in certain constructions, especially in privative noun phrases such as fake gun and counterfeit document. Furthermore, I show that if we modify the compositional interpretation rules in certain simple ways, this dual content account of noun phrase modification can be implemented in a type-driven formal semantic framework. In addition, I also argue against traditional accounts of privative noun phrases which can be paired with the assumption that nouns do not have a dual semantic structure. At the most general level, this paper presents a proposal for how we can begin to integrate a psychologically realistic account of lexical semantics with a linguistically plausible compositional semantic framework.

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confidence: 99%

Dual Content Semantics, privative adjectives, and dynamic compositionality

Pinal

2015

S&P

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“…Another concept acquisition approach is offered by Eric Margolis (1998), and is indeed later endorsed by Fodor himself (LOT2 2008). It was the hope of Margolis to appease the tensions between Lexical Concept Nativism and Lexical Concept Empiricism, and it was his hope to do so by describing a process for the acquisition of representationally simple concepts.…”

Section: Neither Rupert Nor Margolis Meets Fodor's Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

Baptizing Meanings for Concepts

Oved¹

2010

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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“…However, files are not constitutive of concepts-on the Fodorian view concepts are strictly atomic LOT symbols. Nevertheless, concepts might have complex representational content (as most of them do) which might be accessible for further cognitive processing via the associated files if those are not empty (Margolis, 1999).…”

Section: Fodorian Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

Fazekas

2010

Philosophia

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The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper.

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How to Acquire a Concept

Cited by 163 publications

References 32 publications

Dual Content Semantics, privative adjectives, and dynamic compositionality

Dual Content Semantics, privative adjectives, and dynamic compositionality

Baptizing Meanings for Concepts

Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

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