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Robert SugdenSchool of How assessments of individual welfare should be aggregated has been one of the core theoretical problems of welfare economics, for which there is still no universally accepted solution; but that problem is orthogonal to the topic of this paper. For many years, however, there was general agreement on the criterion for assessing what is good for each individual, considered separately. The traditional criterion is preference-satisfaction: if some individual prefers one state of affairs to another, the former is deemed to be better for him than the latter.This consensus has been disturbed by recent developments in experimental and behavioural economics. As usually applied, the criterion of preference-satisfaction presupposes that each individual has well-formed and reasonably stable preferences over the social states that welfare economics needs to assess. By interpreting those assumed preferences as expressing the individual's judgements about what is good for him, welfare economics can provide a reasonably persuasive justification for the preference-satisfaction criterion. But that presupposition has been called into question by the findings of behavioural economics. Those findings suggest that individuals often come to decision problems without well-defined preferences that pre-exist the particular problem they face;instead, whatever preferences they need to deal with that problem are constructed in the course of thinking about it. Such 'constructed' preferences can be influenced by features of the framing of the problem that seem to have no bearing on the individual's well-being. As a result, the preferences that an individual reveals with respect to given objects of choice (for example, preferences over given bundles of consumption goods) can vary across decision problems according to apparently arbitrary differences of framing. Often, the influence of framing can be explained by reference to the decision-making heuristics that the individual uses to process different decisions problems. But however valuable those heuristics may be #1121 3 in helping an individual with limited cognitive powers to navigate a complex world, it is difficult to maintain that the preferences they construct are the...