How Strong are Ethnic Preferences?

Berge, Lars Ivar Oppedal; Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Galle, Simon; Miguel, Edward; Posner, Daniel N.; Tungodden, Bertil; Zhang, Kelly

doi:10.3386/w21715

Cited by 28 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…These divisions are neither fixed nor exogenous and instead depend on the political boundaries within which groups are organized. Interethnic preferences are known to be context-dependent (Berge et al 2015;Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010;Habyarimana et al 2007;Lowes et al 2015) and manipulable by the media (Blouin andMukand 2019, Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). We show that subnational boundaries are a policy choice that can change ethnic cleavages.…”

Section: Relatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Bazzi

Gudgeon

2021

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

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We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit. (JEL D72, D74, J15, O15, O17, O18)

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Section: Relatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Bazzi

Gudgeon

2021

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics

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“…The strong negative correlation between ethnic diversity and economic development observed in cross-country analyses is not necessarily supported by micro-level evidence. Evidence from laboratory experiments shows that co-ethnicity does not predict altruism or other forms of cooperation in many settings, as it is usually confounded with other mechanisms (Berge et al, 2015;Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007) This is also the case of studies that use a networks perspective. Grimard (1997) finds that Ivorian households tend to partially riskshare within the same ethnic group and Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) find that households of the same ethnicity are more likely to belong to the same community-based organizations in Burkina Faso and Senegal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does ethnic diversity decrease economic interactions? Evidence from exchange networks in rural Gambia

Arcand

Jaimovich

2019

Econ of Transit and Inst Chang

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Using a unique dataset collected in 59 rural Gambian villages, we study how ethnic heterogeneity is related to the structure of four economic exchange networks: land, labour, inputs and credit. We find that different measures of village‐level ethnic fragmentation are mostly uncorrelated with network structure. At a more disaggregated level, household heads belonging to ethnic minorities are not less central than those from the predominant ethnicity in any of the networks and, at the dyadic level, the fact that two households share ethnicity is not an economically significant predictor of link formation. Our results indicate that, in the particular setting of our study, the structure of the exchange networks is better defined by other variables than ethnicity and that ethnic heterogeneity is unlikely to be a driver for sub‐optimal economic exchanges.

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“…Similarly, the present study is limited in that it used photographs to provide racial information. 16 Of course, pictures convey much more information than recipient's race, including presented gender [44], prior friendship [45] and subtle facial cues [46]. Indeed, disentangling the effects of this information is an active area of research [47].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Price and Wolfers [14] argue implicit bias explains discriminatory behavior amongst NBA referees. In Africa, Lowes et al [15] find evidence of ethnic homophily in the DRC capital, though Berge et al [16] find little evidence of ethnic biases in Nairobi. In Europe, implicit bias has been predictive of negative hiring conditions [17] and job performance [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?

Lee

2018

Games

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Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness or conscious direction, yet there is reason to believe they may be influenced by social pressures. In this paper, I study social pressure as a motive to give, as well as giving itself under conditions of implicit bias. In doing so, I pair the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, with a laboratory dictator game with sorting. I find that despite its popularity, the IAT does not predict dictator giving and social pressure does not explain acts of giving from biased dictators. These results are indicative of the meaningful difference between having an implicit bias and acting on one. As such, results can be thought of as a bound on the external validity of the IAT.

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How Strong are Ethnic Preferences?

Cited by 28 publications

References 66 publications

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Does ethnic diversity decrease economic interactions? Evidence from exchange networks in rural Gambia

Does Implicit Bias Predict Dictator Giving?

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