How Stories in Memory Perpetuate the Continued Influence of False Information

Abstract

People often encounter information that they subsequently learn is false. Past research has shown that people sometimes continue to use this misinformation in their reasoning, even if they remember that the information is false, which researchers refer to as the continued influence effect. The current work shows that the continued influence effect depends on the stories people have in memory: corrected misinformation was found to have a stronger effect on people's beliefs than information that was topically related to the story if it helped to provide a causal explanation of a story they had read previously. We argue this effect occurs because information that can fill a causal "gap" in a story enhances comprehension of the story event, which allows people to build a complete (if inaccurate) event model that they prefer over an accurate but incomplete event model. This effect is less likely to occur for stories in memory that end in a negative way, presumably because people are more motivated to accurately understand negative outcome events.

Refuting Spurious COVID-19 Treatment Claims Reduces Demand and Misinformation Sharing

“…They also demonstrate the value of an evidence-based approach to debunking. This is in line with previous research (Paynter et al, 2019;Swire et al, 2017) but one of the first demonstrations of this kind with behavioural measures (also see Hamby et al, 2020). This is of particular relevance given (1) the need for studies to take steps towards addressing the attitude-behaviour gap (McEachan et al, 2011), and (2) previous work questioning the utility of refutations when it comes to behaviours (Swire-Thompson, DeGutis, & Lazer, 2020;Swire-Thompson, Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Berinsky, 2020).…”

“…The need for objective behavioural indicators is particularly acute in the context of COVID-19, where the combination of high anxiety levels and need for effective treatment may foster misinformation-driven demand for remedies that are ineffective and often dangerous, including bleach, methylated spirits, or essential oils (e.g., Spinney, 2020; note, however, that for ethical reasons we selected a product for the current study that is unproven as a COVID-19 treatment but relatively safe). Given the well-established attitudebehaviour gap (e.g., McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011), it is critical that studies take steps towards investigating how misinformation affects behaviour, and to what extent corrections can undo those effects (Hamby, Ecker, & Brinberg, 2020).…”

A Comparison of Prebunking and Debunking Interventions for Implied versus Explicit Misinformation

“…Our results add to a growing literature showing the general utility of prebunking and debunking (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2015;Paynter et al, 2019;van der Linden et al, 2020), although, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effects of prebunking using behavioural measures (for effects of debunking on behavioural measures, see Hamby et al 2020, and. This is also one of the first studies to compare directly pre-emptive and retroactive correction interventions, corroborating evidence that prebunking may be less effective than debunking (e.g., Brashier et al, 2021;Walter & Murphy, 2018), rather than evidence suggesting the contrary (e.g., Bolsen & Druckman, 2015;Jolley & Douglas, 2017).…”

Von Fehlinformationen lernen

“…Menschen präferieren Klarheit in Form eines lückenlosen, aber fehlerbehafteten Modells, sofern die Alternative Ungewissheit aufgrund eines unvollständigen Modells ist (vgl Hamby et al 2020;. Johnson und Seifert 1994).4 Darum berücksichtigen in ihrer Typologie zu Fehlinformationen explizit eine visuelle Komponente.…”