How State Presence Leads to Civil Conflict

Abstract

Political scientists and policy-makers have long argued that state weakness leads to civil conflict while enhancing state power helps prevent violence. Why, then, has increased state capacity worldwide recently coincided with more civil conflicts? This study argues that enhanced state presence at the sub-national level—a symptom of growing state capacity—may induce violent resistance from the established non-state powers such as local leaders and communities in the short term. Empirically, I conduct two analyses, one at the province level and the other at the ethnic group level. To measure state presence, I use accuracy of census data in the first analysis and global ground transportation data in the second analysis. Results demonstrate that increased state presence triggers civil conflict, particularly in the first five years of such increasing state presence, and this effect is stronger in remote and ethnically heterogeneous regions. Evidence also suggests that ethnic groups settled in peripheral regions are prominent resisters to state penetration. This paper thus expands prior understanding of the role of state power in civil conflicts.

Beyond ethnicity: historical states and modern conflict

“…First, we expect that HSEs are less dangerous when they are located closer to the modern capital. The process of state consolidation often causes conflict between the center and peripheral regions (Ying, 2021). As the costs of governance increase with distance from the center in many modern, especially post-colonial, states (Herbst, 2014), HSEs located closer to the modern-day capital should be easier for the center to incorporate peacefully.…”

“…This dynamic was replicated in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Migdal, 1988) and Mazzuca (2021) observes a similar dynamic whereby conditions at the moment of state formation—especially strong regional powers—help explain state weakness in South and Central America. Recent research suggests that expanding state presence can drive the onset of new internal armed conflicts (Ying, 2021), and as modern states move into areas previously ruled by HSEs, armed conflicts can become more likely. Higher numbers of HSEs may therefore generate more armed conflict in post-colonial period by altering the trajectory of colonial rule and creating conditions where weak, non-democratic states emerged after independence that faced strong internal challengers.…”