How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Bd, Earp; Kl, McLoughlin; Monrad, Joshua Teperowski; Ms, Clark; Crockett, Molly J.

doi:10.31234/osf.io/e7cgq

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…someone charging a neighbor for babysitting their children) would be seen as immoral in another (e.g. a mother charging her son for help babysitting the grandchildren) (Clark et al, 2020;Earp et al, 2020). This suggests that moral inference from moral principles will be sensitive to the kind of social role or relationship that someone is judging for.…”

Section: Moral Inference From Moral Principles Is Relationship-specificmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relational logic of moral inference

Crockett

Everett

Gill

et al. 2021

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

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How do we make inferences about the moral character of others? Here we review recent work on the cognitive mechanisms of moral inference and impression updating. We show that moral inference follows basic principles of Bayesian inference, but also departs from the standard Bayesian model in ways that may facilitate the maintenance of social relationships. Moral inference is not only sensitive to whether people make moral decisions, but also to features of decisions that reveal their suitability as a relational partner. Together these findings suggest that moral inference follows a relational logic: people form and update moral impressions in ways that are responsive to the demands of ongoing social relationships and particular social roles. We discuss implications of these findings for theories of moral cognition and identify new directions for research on human morality and person perception.

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Section: Moral Inference From Moral Principles Is Relationship-specificmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relational logic of moral inference

Crockett

Everett

Gill

et al. 2021

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

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“…People apply different moral motives or values to the behaviors of different targets (Rai & Fiske, 2011;Waytz & Young, 2018). Recent experimental studies found that we do not only judge transgressions or prosocial behaviors differently depending on actors' relationship with the target (Earp et al, 2020;Hughes et al, 2016;McManus et al, 2020); People also react differently to observing close others being victimized, and spare kin and closer, compared to less close, transgressors to third parties from punishment (e.g., Hofmann et al, 2018;Lieberman & Linke, 2007;Weidman et al, 2020). It has been proposed that such effects are at least partly motivated by protecting the mutual relationship (Weidman et al, 2020).…”

Section: Moral Judgment and Close Relationshipsmentioning

confidence: 91%

Other-serving double standards: People show moral hypercrisy in close relationships

Weiß

Burgmer

2021

Journal of Social and Personal Relationships

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Extending research on self-serving double moral standards (hypocrisy), we examine the reverse pattern of other-serving hypercrisy toward close relationship partners. In three studies ( N = 1,019), for various imagined transgressions, people made more lenient moral judgments for their close friends (Studies 1 & 2) and romantic partners (Study 3) compared to themselves. This hypercrisy effect emerged both for transgressions toward third parties (Study 1) and toward each other (i.e., within the relationship; Studies 2 & 3). Moreover, it was moderated by perceptions of the relationship: Participants who more strongly believed their relationship to be a zero-sum game (i.e., needs can only be met competitively) showed greater leniency for themselves and attenuated hypercrisy for mutual transgressions (Studies 2 & 3). Investigating people’s close others rather than strangers as targets of moral judgment thus suggests that other-serving hypercrisy is more prevalent than previously thought, but sensitive to people’s conceptualizations of their relationships.

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“…The strength of these social expectations also may vary. Expectations for a romantic partner's behavior may be fundamentally different than those for a stranger (Clark et al, 2020;Earp et al, 2020). Indeed, perceptions of selfishness can be powerfully shaped by whether the relationship between agents is communal or exchange-based (Clark & Mills, 1979;Clark & Mills, 1993), as well as by the strength of the communal relationship when one does exist (Mills et al, 2004)-topics we further discuss in a section ahead.…”

Section: Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Psychological selfishness

Carlson¹,

Adkins²,

Crockett³

et al. 2020

Preprint

Self Cite

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Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often rely on classical conceptions of selfishness from economics (i.e., rational self-interest) and philosophy (i.e. psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the richer, motivated nature of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit oneself that disregards others’ desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life—facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how utilizing this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness, and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate negative effects of selfishness.

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How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Cited by 9 publications

References 41 publications

The relational logic of moral inference

The relational logic of moral inference

Other-serving double standards: People show moral hypercrisy in close relationships

Psychological selfishness

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