Many hypothesize that the divergence between Democratic and Republican members of Congress is partly attributable to partisan primary elections. Yet most empirical evidence on the influence of primary elections finds small to no effect on member behavior. I argue that existing designs that compare members elected out of nomination systems with more open rules of access to members elected out of more closed systems rest on the crucial and untested assumption that more closed institutions lead to more polarized primary electorates. With survey opinions, turnout validated to voter files, and an IRT model of ideology, I characterize the preferences of Democratic and Republican primary electorates and general electorates in each House district in 2010 and 2012. To the extent that there is a relationship between primary ideology and closed primary institution, it is in the direction opposite that hypothesized. I then show that the primary electorate diverges from the general electorate in every House district and even from supporters of the party in the general election in almost every district, which is consistent with a centrifugal influence of primary voters. These results suggest that institution of nomination may not have a large influence on the type of voters who turn out, and that some other feature of nominating contests must be implicated in polarized primary voters. * I have benefited from comments by seminar participants at Princeton, Stanford, UCLA, and Washington University, Andy Hall, Greg Huber, Gary Jacobson, Thad Kousser, Jeff Lewis, Sam Popkin, Chris Tausanovitch, Lynn Vavreck, the editors, and anonymous reviewers.† Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive #0521, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521; sjhill@ucsd.edu, http://www.sethjhill.com.
1Although primary elections were introduced by reformers around the turn of the twentieth century to democratize American politics, most worry today that primaries are part of a disconnect between what representatives do in Congress and what most citizens would prefer (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams, 2009). Democrats in Congress seem to be more liberal than their districts, Republicans seem to be more conservative than theirs, and compromise is less common than voters desire. The theory connecting primary elections to representative divergence from the general electorate is straightforward. Candidates for office need to win the votes of those who turn out in the elections for which they stand. If a candidate need only win a general election to gain a seat in Congress, the candidate needs to please those citizens who vote in the general election. If the candidate has to first win a partisan primary prior to winning a general election, however, the candidate must please two different voting electorates. Thus, the candidate may have to appeal to the divergent preferences of the primary electorate to the detriment of the general electorate when the primary electorate is filled with citizens of more partisan or extreme preferenc...