How Resolving the Class II Common Property Problem: The case of the Bcgroundfish Trawl Fishery

Grafton, R. Quentin; Nelson, Harry W.; Turris, Bruce R.

doi:10.1002/9780470751589.ch4

Cited by 13 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…2006b; Branch 2006). Additionally, discards of Pacific halibut in the British Columbia fishery were reduced from 900 to 100 metric tonnes under ITQs after individual bycatch quotas were introduced (Grafton et al. 2007b).…”

Section: Impact On Species Covered By Itq Programmesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When co‐operatives were introduced to the Alaskan pollock fishery, catches remained the same but catch rates declined by 60%, implying that more effort was expended (Holland 2000). Similarly, in the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery, catches were reduced more than effort (Grafton et al. 2007b).…”

Section: Impact On Habitat and Non‐target Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery, fishers avoided areas containing species with more constraining TACs, while targeting areas containing species with less constraining TACs (Branch and Hilborn 2008). In that fishery, individual fishers now specialize in particular areas and species, and typically go out on shorter trips, targeting species mixtures with the highest current market prices (Grafton et al. 2007b).…”

Section: Impact On Habitat and Non‐target Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems?

2009

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Introduction 40Impact on species covered by ITQ programmes 41Stewardship 42Relationship between TAC and catches 43Mortality due to lost and abandoned gear (ghost fishing) 43High-grading and discarding in single-species fisheries 44Discarding in multispecies fisheries 45Illegal activities and enforcement 46 Status of ITQ fisheries 48Impact on fish and fisheries outside the ITQ system 49Fishing for catch history 49 AbstractPublished papers were reviewed to assess ecosystem impacts of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and other dedicated access systems. Under ITQs, quota shares increase with higher abundance levels, thus fishers may request lower total allowable catches (TACs) and pay for monitoring and research that improves fishery sustainability. Mortality on target species generally declines because catches are closer to TACs and because ghost fishing through lost and abandoned gear decreases. High-grading and discarding often decline, but may increase if landings (and not catches) count against ITQs and when there is little at-sea enforcement. Overall, ITQs positively impact target species, although collapses can occur if TACs are set too high or if catches are routinely allowed to exceed TACs. Fishing pressure may increase on non-ITQ species because of spillover from ITQ fisheries, and in cases where fishers anticipate that future ITQ allocations will be based on catch history and therefore increase their current catches. Ecosystem and habitat impacts of ITQs were only sparsely covered in the literature and were difficult to assess: ITQs often lead to changes in total fishing effort (both positive and negative), spatial shifts in effort, and fishing gear modifications. Stock assessments may be complicated by changes in the relationship between catch per unit effort, and abundance, but ITQ participants will often assist in improving data collection and stock assessments. Overall, ITQs have largely positive effects on target species, but mixed or unknown effects on non-target fisheries and the overall ecosystem. Favourable outcomes were linked to sustainable TACs and effective enforcement.

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Section: Impact On Species Covered By Itq Programmesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Impact On Habitat and Non‐target Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Impact On Habitat and Non‐target Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems?

2009

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“…This created an incentive for fishers to avoid catching less desirable species, and led to greater communication among skippers to avoid harvesting in areas where there was a high incidence of unwanted species. Fishers have also changed their behavior by using shorter tows, checking their nets more frequently, and employing test tows before fishing (Grafton et al 2006). …”

Section: Multiple Target Speciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This quota reconciliation provides harvesters with the incentive to be much more selective in their fishing practices. As a result, the ratio of at-sea releases to the landed fish weight has greatly declined (Grafton et al 2006). Recently, fishers have, on their own initiative, undertaken research that halved the fishing mortality of bocaccio rockfish (Sebastes paucispinis), a bycatch species that was designated as being at risk in 2002 by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada and for which harvesters do not have specific species quota (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2004b;Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005).…”

Section: Discards and Bycatchesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

Grafton

Árnason

Bjørndal

et al. 2006

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci.

347

239

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Abstract:The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. 710 Résumé : Les échecs des aménagements traditionnels centrés sur les espèces-cibles ont incité plusieurs chercheurs à proposer des approches halieutiques basées sur les écosystèmes pour favoriser les pêches durables. L'approche écosys-témique est nécessaire, en particulier, pour tenir compte des interactions pêche-écosystème; elle ne suffit pas, cependant, par elle-même pour régler deux facteurs importants qui contribuent à rendre les pêches non durables : les incitations insuffisantes pour les pêcheurs et la gestion inefficace souvent présente dans les pêches commerciales déve-loppées qui sont régies principalement par des limites à la récolte totale et par des contrôles d'entrée. Nous croyons qu'on doit mettre beaucoup plus l'accent sur la motivation des pêcheurs dans la gestion de la pêche. En utilisant des données provenant de plus d'une douzaine d'expériences naturelles de pêche commerciale, nous cherchons à démontrer que des approches fondées sur les incitations qui précisent mieux la communauté, les récoltes individuelles et les droits territoriaux et qui évaluent aussi financièrement les services de l'écosystème, couplées avec de la recherche gouvernementale, de la surveillance et de la gestion efficace, promeuvent les pêches commerciales durables.[Traduit par la Rédaction] Grafton et al.

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