How Resistant are Sboxes to Power Analysis Attacks?

Boey, Kean Hong; O’Neill, Máire; Woods, Roger

doi:10.1109/ntms.2011.5720614

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…As case study to evaluate the security level obtained by each proposed implementation, we will design, characterize and attack the PRIDE Sbox-4, which is the most vulnerable component in block ciphers. Most of the DPA attacks on block ciphers target this non-linear operation block (Sboxes), thus it is widely used as a vehicle to evaluate the security level reached by different countermeasure proposals against DPA attacks [5,11,16,23,24,29,31]. Since our purpose is to compare different technologies, we are going to analyze them from an attacker friendly scenario that allows us to set the same attack conditions.…”

Section: Case Study and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Projection of Dual-Rail DPA Countermeasures in Future FinFET and Emerging TFET Technologies

Delgado-Lozano

Tena-Sánchez

Núñez

et al. 2020

J. Emerg. Technol. Comput. Syst.

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The design of near future cryptocircuits will require greater performance characteristics in order to be implemented in devices with very limited resources for secure applications. Considering the security against differential power side-channel attacks (DPA), explorations of different implementations of dual-precharge logic gates with advanced and emerging technologies, using nanometric FinFET and Tunnel FET transistors, are proposed aiming to maintain or even improve the security levels obtained by current Metal-Oxide Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor (MOSFET) technologies and reducing the resources needed for the implementations. As case study, dual-precharge logic primitives have been designed and included in the 4-bit substitution box of PRIDE algorithm, measuring the performance and evaluating the security through simulation-based Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks for each implementation. Extensive electrical simulations with predictive Predictive Transistor model on scaled 16nm and 22nm MOSFET, 16nm and 20nm FinFET, and 20nm Tunnel Field Effect Transistor (TFET) demonstrate a clear evolution of security and performances with respect to current 90nm MOSFET implementations, providing FinFET as fastest solutions with a delay 3.7 times better than conventional proposals, but TFET being the best candidate for future cryptocircuits in terms of average power consumption (x0.02 times compared with conventional technologies) and security in some orders of magnitude.

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Section: Case Study and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Projection of Dual-Rail DPA Countermeasures in Future FinFET and Emerging TFET Technologies

Delgado-Lozano

Tena-Sánchez

Núñez

et al. 2020

J. Emerg. Technol. Comput. Syst.

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“…This makes the SCA using the known Substitute-Box more challenging. These anti-SCA techniques [30] The distribution of the S_Box's HD histogram is shown in Fig. 12.…”

Section: Instance 3 Additional Bonus: Repeat S_box With X_boxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Use Secret-Hashing Technology to Resist Side-Channel Attacks Based on Round-Keys

Chien¹

2023

Preprint

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<p>The development of modern cryptography has not specifically prevented Side-Channel attacks at the outset. Today, the rapid growth in Side-Channel Attacks is a significant threat. This article proposes a Secret-Hashing method that improves the main drawback of the explicitly reversible AES key expansion function. Using an extra Secret-Hashing function based on round-keys of AES to generate new round-keys will break the reversibility between the original round-keys. Let the initial attack requires only the easiest one of the round-keys to be necessary for all round-keys to complete the cracking of AES’s encryption and decryption, increases the resistance of the AES algorithm to Side-Channel Attacks by 10 to 100 times. The method is compatible with the original AES algorithm and signal leakage countermeasures, and the AES encryption and decryption process do not increase any extra payload.</p>

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“…Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is most common and useful only when the algorithm is known. The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) (Boey et al, 2011;Carlier et al, 2004;Waddle and Wagner, 2004) is the most powerful method based on statistical analysis and characteristics of the captured power traces. It is effective even when the algorithm is unknown.…”

Section: Power Analysis Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Defense Mechanism for Differential Power Analysis Attack in AES

Rajaram¹,

Vijaya²

2015

Journal of Computer Science

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Abstract:In modern wireless communication world, the security of data transfer has been the most challenging task. In embedded system, AES is the most extensively used cryptographic algorithm in practice. But its functionality has been disrupted by the DPA attack. There have been several countermeasures to tackle those attacks, but this study proposes variably a new measure to defend this DPA attack. DPA attack is possible due to the power fluctuation happening due to sequential circuit clocking during the process of substitute byte in AES encryption in the first round and last round. Hence to prevent this, the power variation is maintained at a constant pace throughout the data processing. This is achieved by incorporating a combinational logic design instead of a sequential logic circuit in AES. The proposed design is implemented in Vertex III FPGA device and found even after 17230 power traces the secret key is not disclosed as the power fluctuations is completely random. The power consumption when experimented by micro wind software proves to be constant and the same power (almost) is obtained while implementing it hardware and no chance of identifying the instant of data processing is achieved.

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How Resistant are Sboxes to Power Analysis Attacks?

Cited by 5 publications

References 7 publications

Projection of Dual-Rail DPA Countermeasures in Future FinFET and Emerging TFET Technologies

Projection of Dual-Rail DPA Countermeasures in Future FinFET and Emerging TFET Technologies

Use Secret-Hashing Technology to Resist Side-Channel Attacks Based on Round-Keys

A Defense Mechanism for Differential Power Analysis Attack in AES

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