Abstract:Social partners (trade unions and employers' associations) shape labour institutions and economic and social outcomes in many countries. In this paper, we argue that, when examining social partners' representativeness, it is important to consider both affiliation and dissimilarity measures. The latter concerns the extent to which affiliated and nonaffiliated firms or workers are distributed similarly across relevant dimensions, including firm size. In our analysis of European Company Survey data, we find that … Show more
“…In constructing this index, an important step consists of defining labour market cells. We have followed an approach similar to Martinez Matute and Martins (2022), defining a labour market cell as the interaction between sectors, regions and classes of firms' size. In particular, we have used a definition of cells constructed using three firm size levels (below 15, between 15 and 49 and above 49 employees), four geographic levels (North-West, North-East, Centre and Southern Italy) and 12 industry levels.…”
Section: Dissimilarity Of Firms Depending On Affiliation Statusmentioning
This study analyses the representativeness of employer associations in Italy, using unique firm‐level data with information on employers' affiliation and their characteristics. We document that a persistent decline in affiliation rates to employers' associations has occurred during the last two decades. We show that affiliated companies are positively selected, as they tend to be larger, older, more likely to be located in richer regions, to be export and innovation oriented, and more likely to provide training. Using longitudinal data and regression decomposition techniques, we show that larger firms have been more affected by the decline in affiliation rates over time. Finally, we show that the level of representativeness of employers' associations has a weak positive effect on collective bargaining occupational wage minima settled by these organizations in national industry‐wide collective contracts after a negotiation process with trade unions.
“…In constructing this index, an important step consists of defining labour market cells. We have followed an approach similar to Martinez Matute and Martins (2022), defining a labour market cell as the interaction between sectors, regions and classes of firms' size. In particular, we have used a definition of cells constructed using three firm size levels (below 15, between 15 and 49 and above 49 employees), four geographic levels (North-West, North-East, Centre and Southern Italy) and 12 industry levels.…”
Section: Dissimilarity Of Firms Depending On Affiliation Statusmentioning
This study analyses the representativeness of employer associations in Italy, using unique firm‐level data with information on employers' affiliation and their characteristics. We document that a persistent decline in affiliation rates to employers' associations has occurred during the last two decades. We show that affiliated companies are positively selected, as they tend to be larger, older, more likely to be located in richer regions, to be export and innovation oriented, and more likely to provide training. Using longitudinal data and regression decomposition techniques, we show that larger firms have been more affected by the decline in affiliation rates over time. Finally, we show that the level of representativeness of employers' associations has a weak positive effect on collective bargaining occupational wage minima settled by these organizations in national industry‐wide collective contracts after a negotiation process with trade unions.
“…Such coordination ensures that firms comply with the standards of apprenticeship training and contributes to preventing poaching of skilled labor (Soskice, 1994). More generally, it reduces competition among employers by facilitating collusion so they get monopsony power in the labor market (Martins, 2020). An EA can help sustain collusion by monitoring firms.…”
Section: Benefits and Costs Of A Membershipmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, if younger firms have a lower ability to pay, the wages set in collective agreements may be too high for these firms (Martins, 2020). The technology of younger firms may have not yet been well defined (Bartel, 1994) and they are less likely to produce well-known products providing a brand loyalty of customers (Scherer, 1980).…”
Section: Firm Agementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Employers' associations are also important actors in the political system lobbying the state on behalf of their members and participating in corporatist arrangements. This gives rise to the question of their representativeness (Martinez Matute and Martins, 2020). Examining the factors that influence firms' membership in employers' associations can provide useful indications of which interests employers' associations represent in the political arena.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Altogether, this study contributes to the literature by combining two hitherto largely unconnected strands of studies -studies on collective bargaining coverage and studies on membership in employers' associations. In particular, the fledgling literature on membership in employers' associations is rather small (e.g., Behrens and Helfen, 2016;Gooberman et al, 2019;Martins, 2020;Silvia and Schroeder, 2007). A few studies have used aggregate industry-or country-level data to examine the determinants of membership density (Brandl and Lehr, 2019;Helfen, 2011;Traxler, 2000Traxler, , 2004.…”
While there is a strong overlap between membership in employers’ associations and collective bargaining coverage, the overlap is far from being perfect. Using unique firm-level data from Germany, this study estimates the determinants of the membership in employers’ associations and the coverage by industry-level or firm-level agreements. The analysis particularly focuses on the various constellations of membership and collective bargaining status. The results show that firm-level worker representation, foreign ownership, work organization, firm size, age and East–West differences are important determinants. Altogether, the analysis demonstrates that a more differentiated picture of industrial relations can be obtained by considering both membership in employers’ associations and collective bargaining coverage.
Institutional transformations in recent decades have limited the weight and power of collective actors. Notwithstanding this, literature on employer associations (EAs) has argued a resilient performance in terms of affiliation. In this paper, we use comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the actual scope of these associations in terms of membership and the share of workforce employed by their members. Moreover, by utilising a logistic regression approach we delve into the drivers of the choice to join these organisations. Our results show a general decline of EAs, and point to large manufacturing companies as the great reservoirs of affiliation. However, institutional variations across Europe cause significant differences between countries. We thus demonstrate how membership is strongly influenced by the institutional framework, the relevance of the variables related to the provision of collective goods as a counterbalance to trade union activity and adherence to collective bargaining schemes.
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