How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination

Jagnow, René

doi:10.1007/s11097-008-9118-y

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

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“…The difference between the changing and unchanging elements is like the difference between two independent perceived features, e.g texture and lightness, rather than the difference between sensing and judging. This approach has been less well-represented in the more recent literature although there are exceptions in both color science (Mausfeld 2003) and philosophy (Hilbert 2005;Jagnow 2009). The crucial feature that all views of this kind have in common is that the illumination-dependent and illuminationindependent elements are of the same type and the process that generates them 4 The sensory core plus judgment structure is far from specific to color.…”

Section: Two Theories Of Change and Constancymentioning

confidence: 99%

Constancy, Content, and Inference

Hilbert¹

2012

Visual Experience

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As color constancy is standardly conceived, perfect color constancy would involve the apparent colors of objects being completely invariant with respect to changes in illumination (and scene composition). The illuminant would not figure in the way objects look (in respect of color) and an apple or a rose would look the same color under the fluorescent lights of my office or the direct sunlight of the plaza outside. Although we might see lights, the way in which an object is illuminated would play no role in its appearance. Yet it is quite common, particularly in travel writing and writing about art to find statements like the following explanation of why there is so much brightly colored stuff in southern California: "Failing to understand that the beautiful coloring of the land is not a reflection of things, but consists in the peculiar quality of the light itself, newcomers have indulged in riotously incongruous color schemes." (McWilliams 1973) Or to take an even more extreme claim, "The choice and composition of landscape could narrate a feeling of the locale; for the painter George Harvey all of America was definable by the peculiar quality of the light."(Reese and Miles 1996) Now it could be that the authors are thinking of the peculiar appearance of the principle sources of light, i.e. the sun and sky, but I doubt it. They could also be noticing failures of color constancy, consistent shifts in the apparent colors of objects when viewed in the special circumstances of Los Angeles and the like. This is more plausible, but the idea that I would like to explore is the possibility that these writers are responding to the way the things they see are illuminated but not by way of a failure of color constancy. Discussion of this possibility will then lead to a consideration of different ways of understanding some of the processes that give rise to the imperfect degree of color constancy actually possessed by human color vision.

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Section: Two Theories Of Change and Constancymentioning

confidence: 99%

Constancy, Content, and Inference

Hilbert¹

2012

Visual Experience

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Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience

O’Dea

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism

Millar¹

2012

Philos Stud

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All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience's phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the Fregean variety of the view is preferable to the Russellian variety because the former can accommodate purported counterexamples involving spectrum inversion without illusion and colour constancy while the latter cannot. I maintain that colour constancy poses a special problem for the Fregean theory in that the features of the theory that enable it handle spectrum inversion without illusion cannot be extended to handle colour constancy. I consider the two most plausible proposals regarding how the Fregean view might be developed in order to handle colour constancy-one of which has recently been defended by Thompson (Australas J Philos 87:99-117, 2009)-and argue that neither is adequate. I conclude that Fregean representationalism is no more able to accommodate colour constancy than is Russellian representationalism and, as such, ought to be rejected.

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How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination

Cited by 6 publications

References 27 publications

Constancy, Content, and Inference

Constancy, Content, and Inference

Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience

Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism

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