How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection?

Renneboog, Luc; Szilagyi, Peter G.

doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2015.01.006

Cited by 49 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Thus, controlling shareholders becomes the bridge between management and shareholders to reduce the agency issue (Konijn et al 2011;Su et al 2013). In the exportation perspective factors, family owners can exploit the resources of minority shareholders for their personal benefit by reducing the dividend payments due to their high ownership concentration and active participation in company matters (Shleifer and Vishny 1986;Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003;Renneboog and Szilagyi 2015). The contribution of family firms in the economy is significantly high, and globally more than 50% of firms are controlled by family groups using cross-stock holding in different firms (La Porta et al 1998) where they also affect the financial policies of firms such as dividend policies (Ramli 2010).…”

Section: Family Ownership and Board Gender-diversitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

Mustafa

Saeed

Awais

et al. 2020

JRFM

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In eras of intense debates on the appointment of women on corporate boards, this research sheds light on the structure of board in Asian emerging economies by examining how women on board of family businesses separately and collectively affect the dividend announcement of business organizations. On the basis of the panel data of four Asian emerging economies—China, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India—for the period 2010–2018, the results from our Tobit regression showed the adverse (negative) and significant impact of women on boards and in family businesses upon dividend announcement. It is important that policymakers should not view firms with one eye. There should be a spillover on board gender diversity from international to domestic levels, and international firms should be set as an example for domestic firms for the inclusion of women on boards. It might be the best time for Asian emerging economies to take productive action for balancing the gender in boardroom settings, and to set a minimum mass of women on boards for better and more effective decision making.

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Section: Family Ownership and Board Gender-diversitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

Mustafa

Saeed

Awais

et al. 2020

JRFM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…In the theory of outcome mentioned that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance with dividend policy (Kowalewski et al, 2007;La Porta et al, 2000). On the other hand, in the substitution theory mentioned that the weaker corporate governance practice, the company will provide higher dividends (Renneboog dan Szilagyi, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Indonesia

Mardani¹,

Moeljadi²,

Sumiati³

et al. 2018

KSS

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“…Scholars have not directly examined the relationship between board network cohesion and shareholder rewards short-termism. Yet, studies show that repurchase activity is less pronounced in firms in which managers have greater decision-making autonomy (e.g., Renneboog and Szilagyi 2015) and is more pronounced when managers' discretion is curtailed and incentives closely align with short-term shareholder interests (Geiler and Renneboog 2016).…”

Section: Shareholder Rewards Short-termismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eyes on the Horizon? Fragmented Elites and the Short-Term Focus of the American Corporation

Benton¹,

Cobb

2019

American Journal of Sociology

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Recent scholarship expresses concerns that U.S. corporations are too focused on short-term performance, undermining their long-term competitiveness. We examine how short-term strategies and performance, or short-termism, results from the dissolution of the American corporate elite network. We argue that the corporate board interlock network traditionally served as a collective resource that helped corporate elites to preserve their autonomy and control, mitigating short-termism. In recent years, changing board-appointment practices have fractured the board network, undermining its usefulness as a platform for collective action and exposing corporate leaders to short-term pressures. We develop and apply a cohesion metric for network managerialism, derived from theory and evidence in social-network scholarship. Using three indicators that capture short-termism earnings management and shareholder returns, we identify a structural basis for short-termism that links network-based resources to managers' decisions. The results highlight the benefits of the corporate elite network and illustrate unforeseen consequences of the network's dissolution.

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How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder protection?

Cited by 49 publications

References 66 publications

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Indonesia

Eyes on the Horizon? Fragmented Elites and the Short-Term Focus of the American Corporation

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