How Populists Wage Opposition: Parliamentary Opposition Behaviour and Populism in Netherlands

Abstract

This article analyses how populist parties wage opposition in parliament. We conceptualise opposition behaviour in terms of two independent dimensions: scrutiny (monitoring and criticising government actions) and policy-making (participating in or directly influencing legislative production). In line with the conceptualisation of populism as an opposition to the ruling elite in name of 'the people', our hypothesis is that populist opposition parties are more likely to use scrutiny and less likely to use policy-making tools than non-populist opposition parties. We study the Netherlands between 1998 and 2017 as a typical example of a consensus democracy, where populist parties have a greater opportunity to win representation and use parliamentary tools (compared to majoritarian democracies). Our findings indicate that populist opposition parties are particularly less likely to engage in policy-making behaviour and somewhat more likely to engage in scrutiny behaviour.

Voting for Votes: Opposition Parties’ Legislative Activity and Electoral Outcomes

“…In distinguishing between policy-making and scrutiny activities, Louwerse and Otjes (2019) ascribe appeals to voters to the scrutiny category, which includes activities such as questions and legislative voting (against the government). Others have identified vote-seeking uses of, for example, no-confidence or impeachment motions (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Linan 2008; Williams 2011; 2016); parliamentary questions, either as a way to raise constituency concerns (e.g., Kellermann 2016; Russo 2011; Saalfeld 2011; Wegmann and Evequoz 2019) or to criticize the government (Seeberg 2020); and private member bills (Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Bräuninger, Debus, and Wüst 2017; Brunner 2013).…”

Engaging the disengaged? Explaining the participation of Eurosceptic MEPs in trilogue negotiations

“…These strategies may take different forms: first, they might decide to abstain, which would be in line with their tradition of absenting themselves as a way of rejecting the EP as a legitimate institution. Second, they might decide to voice their rejection by criticizing the work of the EU or the content of its policies, which is often used in domestic parliaments when non-mainstream parties sit in the opposition (Louwerse & Otjes, 2019). Finally, they might prefer to voice their opposition by blocking the work of other MEPsfor instance, introducing bogus amendments that will slow down negotiations.…”

Threat or Corrective? Assessing the Impact of Populist Parties in Government on the Qualities of Democracy: A 19-Country Comparison

“…Whatever the approach used to describe populism – a thin-centred ideology (Mudde 2004), a communication style (Moffitt 2016), a synonym for political illiberalism (Pappas 2016a), an empty signifier (Laclau 2005), a political mobilization tool (Jansen 2011), a discursive tool (Jagers and Walgrave 2007) – the literature has now dealt with multiple aspects of the populist phenomenon. To name just a few topics, populist attitudes among voters (Castanho Silva et al 2020), the presence of populism in party manifestos and leader discourses (Hawkins et al 2018; Rooduijn et al 2014), populism in party organization (Vittori 2020), the mainstreaming of both left and right populism (Akkerman et al 2016; Damiani 2020) and populist parties in opposition (Louwerse and Otjes 2019). One of the most debated issues is the relationship between populism and the so-called ‘qualities’ of (liberal) democracies (Morlino 2011).…”