How Ontology Might Be Possible: Explanation and Inference in Metaphysics

Swoyer, Chris

doi:10.1111/1475-4975.00006

Cited by 25 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…14 The ontological relevance of this kind of anaphora has been highlighted also by Swoyer (1999) and Künne (2006). In general, an anaphora is a linguistic phenomenon whereby the referent of a term is supplied by another term occurring in the same, or in a previous, or in a subsequent sentence: e.g.…”

Section: Argument [A]mentioning

confidence: 91%

The Nominalist’s Gambit and the Structure of Predication

Calemi

2014

Metaphysica

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Call the realist thesis that the truth of statements of the form "a is F" entails the existence of properties only via the schema "a is F iff a instantiates F-ness" introductionism; call the nominalist thesis that the schema "a is F iff a instantiates F-ness" doesn't really introduce properties into the domain of discourse anti-introductionism. I'll show that both introductionism and anti-introductionism presuppose two crucial assumptions concerning abstract singular terms and predicates, that in turn constitute the pivots of an (allegedly) cogent argument against realism, that is the socalled nominalist's gambit. Moreover, moving from the phenomenon that I'll call property-anaphora, I hold that these presuppositions are reciprocally incompatible. I'll conclude that introductionism and anti-introductionism are positions based on an inconsistent ground, and that the nominalist's gambit is without force.

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Section: Argument [A]mentioning

confidence: 91%

The Nominalist’s Gambit and the Structure of Predication

Calemi

2014

Metaphysica

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“…Swoyer 1999, Paul 2012). I will put aside various differences in details and focus on a common gambit of methodological unity, which can be expressed in general terms as follows.…”

Section: On the Strategy Of Methodological Similaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this account unification comes out, first of all, as one of several competing 31 See Swoyer (1999Swoyer ( , 2008, Armstrong 1997, pp. 235-6), andSider (2007), for example.…”

Section: Issues With Mc3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Explanation and Explanationism in Science and Metaphysics

Saatsi¹

2017

Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science

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“…4 For helpful discussion about various putative property roles, see Oliver (1996), Swoyer (1999), andEdwards (2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God

Garcia

2015

EJPR

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I aim to synthesize two issues within theistic metaphysics. The first concerns the metaphysics of creaturely properties and, more specifically, the nature of unshareable properties, or tropes. The second concerns the metaphysics of providence and, more specifically, the way in which God sustains creatures, or sustenance. I propose that creaturely properties, understood as what I call modifier tropes, are identical with divine acts of sustenance, understood as acts of property-conferral. I argue that this theistic conferralism is attractive because it integrates trope theory and the doctrine of sustenance in a mutually enhancing way. Taking modifier tropes to be divine acts mitigates certain weaknesses of trope theory and safeguards divine sustenance from the threat of both deism and occasionalism.

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How Ontology Might Be Possible: Explanation and Inference in Metaphysics

Cited by 25 publications

References 12 publications

The Nominalist’s Gambit and the Structure of Predication

The Nominalist’s Gambit and the Structure of Predication

Explanation and Explanationism in Science and Metaphysics

Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God

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