How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997

Abstract

Kenya is on the short list of African states that have not experienced military rule. In a continent known for rampant praetorianism, this means only that the coup prevention strategies implemented by its civilian rulers have been successful...so far. The unscrupulous ethnic manipulation, politicization, bribery into the military's "circles of power," and the set-up of a powerful paramilitary as a counterweight to the army have done little to institutionalize civilian control. These strategies, inaugurated by President Jomo Kenyatta and taken to new heights by his successor Daniel Arap Moi, entailed neither military professionalization, military autonomy and political insulation, nor regime-legitimizing policies. The evidence of the case study suggests that the adverse effects of Kenya's civilian control strategies support Samuel Huntington's and Claude Welch Jr.'s hypothesis that only the professionalization and political insulation of the military are more likely to ensure its continued subordination to civilian control. The strategies implemented since independence epitomize the model of civil-military relations that Africa's fledgling democracies should avoid if democratic civilian control of the military is to take root on the continent.

Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état

“…Most importantly, commentaries frequently attest to the efforts of leaders to coupproof their regimes. Though accounts of coup-proofing have frequently been made for specific countries (N'Diaye 2000(N'Diaye , 2002 or regions (Quinlivan 1999), and though a study of a global sample suggests vulnerable regimes do actively coup-proof (Belkin and Schofer 2003), the utility of these efforts had yet to be empirically demonstrated.…”

“…First (1970, 429), for example, noted that numerous African regimes had decreased the prospects of a coup by ''building up counter-forces'' within their militaries and security services. The infamous 1982 coup attempt perpetrated by the Kenyan Air Force, for example, was violently stopped by the General Services Unit (Frazer 1994;N'Diaye 2002). On the other hand, the 1974 ouster of Nigerien president Hamani Diori has also been noted by Higgot and Fuglestad (1975) to be a consequence of his refusal to fractionalize the armed forces for the purposes of coup-proofing.…”

Trickle-Down Ethnic Politics: Drunk and Absent in the Kenya Police Force (1957–1970)

“…If incentives for misbehavior are not internal to the police, they could still be external, through improved outside options. 32 But, the historical context suggests that police jobs were relatively attractive (N'Diaye 2002, Potholm 1969. As an illustration, the salary of constables exceeded the one of primary school teachers even though the latter had to fulfil strict educational requirements (Republic of Kenya 1967).…”

The Military Coups in Fiji: Reactive and Transformative Tendencies

“…On the other side of the continuum, Kenya is one of the very few countries in Africa which has not experienced military rule, not so much because of the political insulation and professionalism of the military but the capacity of the leaders since Jomo Kenyatta to control, manoeuvre and use the military to their advantage, despite attempts by political groups outside the state to influence the military (N'Diaye, 2002).…”