How Municipal Takeovers Reshape Urban Democracy: Comparing the Experiences of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan

Abstract

Municipal takeovers are a state policy ostensibly designed to address urban fiscal crises by “temporarily” taking over local government, suspending local control, and implementing sweeping austerity measures. Although framed as “apolitical,” takeovers have the capacity to reshape local democracy. These changes radically rearrange how decisions are made, who has access to decision makers, and, ultimately, who is in power. Using a policy-centered approach, we compare the cases of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan, illustrating how variations in policy design and localized implementation reshaped the local political landscape in different ways. While the Camden takeover institutionalized the emergent “community development regime,” Flints’ grassroots activists and community-based organizations destabilized the emergent regime.

Governing Without Government: Nonprofit Governance in Detroit and Flint

“…Compared to Detroit’s bankruptcy, which officially ended on November 7, 2014, the consequences of the Flint water crisis lack a finite ending, meaning the relationship of nonprofits and city government in Flint could be impacted by this challenge for a much longer time horizon. This finding confirms the conclusions found in Nickels, Clark, and Wood’s (2019) work that compares Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan and finds that the success of community and economic development efforts in capacity compromised cities is highly dependent on the inclusion of nonprofit into the local policy agenda. Nonprofits, in the absence of local capacity, in the city of Flint have largely collaborated with each other rather than the local regime in forging new pathways to respond to the crisis and it is unclear whether the city at this time can or will anchor these new players into the long-term decision making of the city.…”

“…In 2011, the State of Michigan declared a financial emergency in Flint and appointed an emergency manager, which removed power from the local government. In 2014, emergency manager Darnell Earley, (the fourth of six) oversaw the switch of Flint’s water supply from the Detroit water system to the Flint River (Brush et al 2015; Nickels, Clark, and Wood 2019). This decision was motivated by financial considerations—the move was reported at the time to save US$5 million while a new pipeline was completed connecting the city to Lake Huron (Jurkiewicz 2016).…”

“… 1. For additional background on Michigan’s emergency manager law, see: https://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/EMF_Fact_Sheet2_347889_7.pdf. For a good overview of the efforts to recall the EM law in Flint, see Nickels, Clark, and Wood (2019). …”

Helping or Hurting? The Efficacy of Municipal Bankruptcy

“…This stands in contrast to a potential alternative to Chapter 9, namely state intervention via the imposition of an emergency manager. In those situations, local control is removed and placed in the hands of an unelected technocrat (Clark and Gorina 2017; Nickels, Clark, and Wood 2020; Shumberger, Singla, and Spreen 2020). Second, the goal of municipal bankruptcy is the continued operation of the entity, not its orderly demise; this means that the court cannot require the government to sell assets in order to meet its obligations (Chung 2015).…”

Flint, Michigan, and the Politics of Safe Drinking Water in the United States

“…There has been significant political opposition to PA 436 in Flint, including local organizing that led to a recall effort for former Governor Snyder, a successful direct ballot repeal of PA 4, and legal challenges in state and federal courts. At least one community organization, the Flint Democracy Defense League, emerged in direct opposition to Public Act 4 and then Public Act 436, 1 and has been effective in helping to destabilize the long-term policy effects of emergency management in Flint (Nickels, Clark, and Wood 2019). The rationalization of Flint’s financial distress by elected and appointed leaders in Michigan, and the subsequent prioritization of financial risk to the state and creditors over health risks of city residents, led to decisions that ultimately proved lethal.…”