How many and why? A question for Graham Oppy that classical theism can answer

Abstract

I argue that classical theism has a significant advantage as a theory of the First Cause over Graham Oppy's naturalistic account. This is because classical theism not only gives us a clear answer to the question of how many first causes there are but also because it explains why there is that number and not another. In comparison, Oppy's ‘initial physical state’ account seemingly leaves these questions hopelessly open, and so does his ‘metaphysical simples’ proposal for a foundational layer of reality. I end by exploring two arguments from omnipotence and perfection that could be of use also to non-classical theists.

‘There can be only one’: A response to Joseph C. Schmid

“…would have to be unique. (Gel (2021), 3) 3 Schmid (2022, 6) helpfully formalizes said argument thus:…”

“…Recently, I argued that theism (both in its classical and non-classical forms) enjoys an advantage over Graham Oppy's naturalism as a theory of the First Cause (Gel (2021)) 1 . Given that there are several well-known arguments for the conclusion that there can be only one God, theism is able to give us an answer to how many first causes there are (one) and why (because there can be only one).…”

“…) 2 would appear arbitrary, especially given the fact that there does not seem to be a way to explain why such a number could not have been different, not even by a unit. Indeed, ‘[w]hat about the nature of initial physical items would make it impossible for there to be one more or one less than a given number N?’ (Gel (2021), 4). No answer appears to be forthcoming.…”

“…Can the naturalist appropriate the theist's unicity arguments and adapt them to a naturalistic First Cause? I briefly considered this question in my previous article (Gel (2021), 6 and 8), but it is worth pondering it once more.…”

“…It is not easy to say – there is no straightforward equation when comparing gains in explanation and costs in simplicity. But it is important to remember that the advantage we have been discussing can be taken as ‘an additional or supplementary reason to be weighted jointly with any other available evidence’ (Gel (2021), 8). Maybe this advantage, on its own , does little to tip the scales in favour of theism, but it can still play an interesting role in a more overarching cumulative case that ends up doing just that.…”