2018
DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1439746
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How long until midnight? Intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor, which started operating in 1963, was never put under IAEA inspections because of Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, which was an extremely sensitive issue in U.S.-Israeli relations. 92 According to Haig, Weinberger expressed support for a UN resolution demanding that Israel open Dimona for inspection and calling on Israel to join the NPT. 93 When news of the raid had broken the previous day, Weinberger had told his interlocutor that Begin "must have the Israeli ambassador, telling him that Weinberger had demanded the suspension of all military aid to Israel but that when Haig and Allen strongly objected, the administration had decided the suspension would apply only to the delivery of the four F-16 jets.…”
Section: The Administration's Initial Reaction-shock and Condemnationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor, which started operating in 1963, was never put under IAEA inspections because of Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, which was an extremely sensitive issue in U.S.-Israeli relations. 92 According to Haig, Weinberger expressed support for a UN resolution demanding that Israel open Dimona for inspection and calling on Israel to join the NPT. 93 When news of the raid had broken the previous day, Weinberger had told his interlocutor that Begin "must have the Israeli ambassador, telling him that Weinberger had demanded the suspension of all military aid to Israel but that when Haig and Allen strongly objected, the administration had decided the suspension would apply only to the delivery of the four F-16 jets.…”
Section: The Administration's Initial Reaction-shock and Condemnationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1.On the crucial role of intelligence assessments in nonproliferation, see Bas and Coe 2016; Long and Shifrinson 2019; Montgomery and Mount 2014; Nutt 2019; and Richelson 2007. On nonproliferation policies more broadly, see Braut-Hegghammer 2011; Coe and Vaynman 2015; Gavin 2015; Gerzhoy 2015; Gibbons 2020; Koch 2019; Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011; Mehta 2020; Miller 2014; Rabinowitz 2014; Solingen 2012; and Whitlark 2017.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%