How it is: Entities, absences and voids

Martin, C. B.

doi:10.1080/00048409612347061

Cited by 150 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…It doesn't require the inclusion of any exotic objects in one's ontology. This contrasts strongly with views positing negative facts, totality facts or absences as truthmakers for negative truths (Russell 1918;Priest 2000;Beall 2000;Jago and Barker 2012;Martin 1996;Kukso 2006;Armstrong 1997Armstrong , 2004. In fact, (Simple) doesn't require any modification of one's ontology, given that, by the previous adoption of truthmaking theory, one is already committed to the existence of propositions or to the existence of whatever one's favourite truthbearers happens to be.…”

Section: Advantages Of (Simple)contrasting

confidence: 41%

“…15 C.f. (Martin 1996;Kukso 2006;Jago and Barker 2012) for discussion and reply to these objections. 16 C.f.…”

Section: Rejection Of Thesis (Iv)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, the existence of negative facts has been defended by Priest (2000), rejoined by Beall (2000), and by Jago and Barker (Jago 2011;Jago and Barker 2012). Admission of negative entities to do duty as negative truths' truthmakers have taken various other forms including the admission of negative properties (Van Fraassen 1969), of absences (Martin 1996;Kukso 2006) and of incompatibilities [attributed to (Demos 1917) 11 ]. In the same vein, Armstrong (1997: ch.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Waechter

2016

Philos Stud

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The present paper addresses Molnar's problem (Australas J Philos 78(1): [72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86] 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called (Simple), is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of truthmaking theory. Other advantages of (Simple) are noted: it doesn't require the inclusion of exotic objects in one's ontology; it doesn't require any revision of one's logic or of one's theory of modality. The solution also allows one to eschew negative facts, tropes and properties while providing a definition of negativity (DefNegativity) for certain literal propositions. The paper ends by rebutting several objections that may be levelled against (Simple).

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Section: Advantages Of (Simple)contrasting

confidence: 41%

“…15 C.f. (Martin 1996;Kukso 2006;Jago and Barker 2012) for discussion and reply to these objections. 16 C.f.…”

Section: Rejection Of Thesis (Iv)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Waechter

2016

Philos Stud

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“…Martin's brand of australian realism reflected in his rejection of counterfactual analyses of dispositions, is reflected as well in extended criticisms of dummett and davidson (1984a, 1984b), his insistence on 'ontological candor ' (1993), and most especially in his defence of a robust truthmaking principle: truths need truthmakers, a doctrine Martin has promoted tirelessly since the 1950s (see armstrong 2004; C. Martin 1992Martin , 1996Martin , 2000. More precisely, truths require truthmakers and truth bearers.…”

Section: Martin C Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such totality states of affairs are highly problematic, however, and have come in for much criticism: 'armstrong has become a bit pregnant. he has lost his empiricist virginity and subscribed to the existence of abstract and non-spatio-temporal general factness' (Martin 1996: 59, cf. also Keller 2007.…”

Section: Universalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

Oppy¹,

Trakakis²

2014

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Unstable Truthmaking

Asay¹,

Baron²

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Recent discussion of the problem of negative existentials for truthmaker theory suggests a modest solution to the problem: fully general negative truths like do not require truthmakers, whereas partially general negative truths like do. This modest solution provides a third alternative to the two standard solutions to the problem of negative existentials: the endorsement of truthmaker gaps, and the appeal to contentious ontological posits. We argue that this modest, middle-ground position is inconsistent with certain plausible general principles for truthmaking. The only stable positions are to treat all negative truths as requiring truthmakers, or admit that no negative truths require truthmakers. Along the way, we explore some previously unaddressed questions for nonmaximalist truthmaker theory.

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How it is: Entities, absences and voids

Cited by 150 publications

References 0 publications

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

Unstable Truthmaking

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