How Is Power Shared In Africa?

Abstract

This paper presents new evidence on the power sharing layout of national political elites in a panel of African countries, most of them autocracies. We present a model of coalition formation across ethnic groups and structurally estimate it employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence. As opposed to the view of a single ethnic elite monolithically controlling power, we show that African ruling coalitions are large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful ministerial posts. We argue that the likelihood of revolutions from outsiders and the threat of coups from insiders are major forces explaining such allocations. Further, over-representation of the ruling ethnic group is quantitatively substantial, but not different from standard formateur premia in parliamentary democracies. We explore theoretically how proportional allocation for the elites of each group may still result in misallocations in the non-elite population.

The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa

“…For example, the Yakoma in Central African Republic, the Oroma and the Tigray in Ethiopia, and the Alur, the Madi, and the Lugbara in Uganda, although they have been subject to discrimination and have participated in ethnic wars, they also seem to have taken part in some capacity (either as junior or senior partners) in the various government coalitions over time. This result echoes Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015) finding that groups' participation in the government is widespread. Empirically, this oscillation of split groups between a state of conflict and discrimination at some point and members of governing alliances at other instances translates into an insignificant relationship between partitioning and the probability of a group having ever been a partner in the central government.…”

Does Peace Trickle Down? Micro-Level Evidence from Africa

“…Second, our results help to clarify the debate about the conditions under which ethnic favoritism and redistribution become a salient category of politics in Africa (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015;Posner 2005;Robinson 2014). The broader study of ethnic politics in Africa has made considerable use of micro-level data to uncover ethnicity as a key factor that shapes politics (Habyarimana et al 2007;Kramon and Posner 2016;Franck and Rainer 2012).…”

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

“…These players can be thought of as insurgents in the case of civil war, but also as elites or the electorate in models of political conflict where the leader hopes to avoid a coup or revolution. Besley and Persson (2011), Berman et al (2011), Chaney (2013, Bai and Jia (2016), Francois et al (2015), and Gennaioli and Voth (2015) all reflect this broad theme of "bargaining" between state and non-state actors and identify conditions under which changes in resource allocation will influence the likelihood of conflict.…”