How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind

Abstract

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.

Intergenerational concern relates to constructive coping and emotional reactions to climate change via increased legacy concerns and environmental cognitive alternatives

“…These variables are well-established predictors of forward-thinking behaviors aimed at safeguarding not only one’s own future but also the future well-being of others [ 89 – 99 , 99 ]. Moreover, longtermists engage in greater utopian thinking, and report a greater vividness when envisioning the distant future compared to general population controls, characteristics that contribute to intergenerational and pro-environmental concerns [ 20 , 54 , 55 , 58 , 59 , 69 ]. Given the relevance of these additional factors, they merit consideration as candidate mechanisms that could help bridge the gap between intergenerational concern and coping strategies, as well as emotional reactions in the context of climate change.…”

Me, myself, and everyone else: Potential impacts of episodic processes on national and personal memories.

“…Here, we expanded upon these ideas to discuss the potential contribution of episodic processes. Prior research has revealed that episodic memory for specific personal events can be affected by discussions with others (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010), by age-related shifts in motivation (Reed & Carstensen, 2012), and can direct moral decision-making (Bo O’Connor & Fowler, 2022). Here, we have proposed that understanding similar patterns in memory for specific collective events may reveal additional mechanisms by which memory for national events informs attitudes and behaviors toward members of one’s own country versus other countries.…”

“…Personal and collective cognitive processes may specifically prompt future behaviors in the moral domain. According to Bo O’Connor and Fowler’s (2022) episodic model of moral cognition, the pairing of episodic cognitive processes with moral beliefs may lead to moral decision-making outcomes. For example, imagining or recalling the episodic details of standing up for someone who is being bullied, paired with the belief that this action is the morally good thing to do, may lead to similar actual moral decisions, judgments, or behaviors in the future.…”

Episodic simulation of helping behavior in younger and older adults during the COVID-19 pandemic.

“…Since late 2019, global newsfeeds have been filled with stories about people facing unprecedented hardships due to COVID-19. While exposure to these stories may engender empathy and encourage people to lend a hand, recent research has shown that imagining helping a person in need increases one’s willingness to help more than passively reading the same stories (Gaesser et al, 2018, 2020; Gaesser & Schacter, 2014; see Bo O’Connor & Fowler, 2022, for review). This sort of imagination relies on the ability to “try out” different scenarios by creating mental simulations of events that could happen in the future (i.e., episodic future thinking; Schacter et al, 2008, 2015; Taylor & Schneider, 1989).…”