2020
DOI: 10.1111/meta.12443
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How Not to Criticise Scientism

Abstract: This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and … Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Now you might think that if Strong Scientism succumbs so easily to the counterexample strategy, then there isn't much value in paying so much attention to it. This is what Hietanen and colleagues say (Hietanen et al 2020). Strong Scientism is too easy to refute, and too implausible to merit serious discussion.…”
Section: The Counterexamples Strategymentioning
confidence: 71%
“…Now you might think that if Strong Scientism succumbs so easily to the counterexample strategy, then there isn't much value in paying so much attention to it. This is what Hietanen and colleagues say (Hietanen et al 2020). Strong Scientism is too easy to refute, and too implausible to merit serious discussion.…”
Section: The Counterexamples Strategymentioning
confidence: 71%
“…I will further call this standpoint Luhmann's epistemological scientism (Hietanen et al, 2020) stance toward morality and ethics.…”
Section: Ethics Today Is Nothing More Than a Utopiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the end, Luhmann's epistemological issue with morality seems to be that it is not as scientific, theoretical, and empirical as sociology is (Luhmann, 1996, p. 32). I will further call this standpoint Luhmann's epistemological scientism (Hietanen et al ., 2020) stance toward morality and ethics.…”
Section: Luhmann's Dismissive View On Moralitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although necessary or sufficient conditions are not inevitable for science, as our arguments show, it is still possible that such criteria could exist. For example, it is plausible that there are at least some necessary conditions of science, such as the intersubjective evaluability of theories (Hietanen et al, 2020, pp. 533–534, 539, 541–543; Turunen et al, 2022) or the need to support scientific conclusions with reasons.…”
Section: The Demise Of the Traditional Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%