How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1

Greco, Daniel

doi:10.1111/phpe.12059

Cited by 76 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…This type of phenomenon is well documented in the philosophical literature (see, e.g. Hawthorne , Greco , for discussion, and especially Nagel for an empirically informed account of switching).…”

Section: The Puzzlementioning

confidence: 78%

“…This way of thinking about outright beliefs and credences gives rise to a natural way of incorporating outright beliefs into formal models of doxastic attitudes. In slogan format, the idea is that “belief is credence 1 in context.” Clarke () and Greco (, ) argue that we should identify an outright belief with a credence of 1 in a proposition, but allow that whether a proposition is assigned credence 1 can vary between contexts (see also Harsanyi ). Similarly, Wedgwood () argues that reasoners like us have theoretical credences (the credences that we adopt purely in light of our evidence), and practical credences.…”

Section: The Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…E.g. Buchak , Clarke , Easwaran & Fitelson , Greco , Leitgeb , Lin , Lin & Kelly , Ross & Schroeder , Staffel , Sturgeon , Tang , Weatherson , Wedgwood , Weisberg , Weisberg forthcoming. For earlier discussions of this type of view, see e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?

Staffel

2018

Nous

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According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo‐conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is thus in tension with the view that the function of beliefs is to simplify our reasoning. I propose to resolve this puzzle by rejecting the view that thinkers employ PC. Based on this solution, I furthermore argue for a descriptive and a normative claim. The descriptive claim is that the available strategies for managing beliefs and credences across contexts that are compatible with the simplifying function of outright beliefs can generate synchronic and diachronic incoherence in a thinker's attitudes. Moreover, I argue that the view of outright belief as a simplifying heuristic is incompatible with the view that there are ideal norms of coherence or consistency governing outright beliefs that are too complicated for human thinkers to comply with.

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Section: The Puzzlementioning

confidence: 78%

Section: The Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?

Staffel

2018

Nous

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“…10) agrees but thinks that evidence should not play the certainty‐licensing role. For more on E=K and certainty, see, for example, Clarke (), Greco (; ), Kaplan (), and Williamson (; ).…”

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confidence: 99%

No Crystal Balls

Spencer

2018

Nous

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“…However, the distinction between probabilistic beliefs and credences is important for the points I make in this paper, so some of my arguments may rule out non-standard views of doxastic attitudes. 4 For defenses and discussions of a credence-first view on which belief is maximal credence, see Levi (1991), Roorda (1995), Wedgwood (2012), Clarke (2013), Greco (2015) and Dodd (2016). Note that it is controversial on this view whether the attitude of certainty ought to be identified as credence 1.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters

Jackson

2018

Philos Stud

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In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.

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How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1

Cited by 76 publications

References 32 publications

How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?

How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?

No Crystal Balls

Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters

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