How Homeric is the Aristotelian Conception of Courage?

Abstract

Abtract When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demarcate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit‐caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos‐driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.

What Are We Fighting For: The Noble Goal of Courage in Aristotle's Ethics

“…The detailed analysis of the virtue of courage in Book III is intriguing and puzzling for a number of reasons. Elsewhere, I argue that Aristotle's take on courage in those chapters should be interpreted as pursuing two main objectives: first, to counter the overly inclusive conception of this virtue advocated by Plato (especially in the Laches), and, secondly, to return to the Homeric roots of genuine courage by radically limiting the scope of the truly courageous agents and restricting its manifestation to the martial context (Zavaliy 2017). Plato's take on courage may serve as a helpful background for our discussion of Aristotle.…”

“…Elsewhere I argue that the Homeric model of courage, insofar as it can be reconstructed from the actions of the central heroes of the epics, is fully compatible with the Aristotelian theoretical account, despite Aristotle's explicit protestations (Zavaliy 2017).…”

“…Curzer, among many others, observes that "limiting courage to life-threatening situations [in war] flies in the face of common sense" (2012,25). Elsewhere I argue that such a narrow conception of the circumstances in which courage can be manifested should be explained by Aristotle's desire to conform to the Homeric paradigms of courage (Zavaliy 2017).…”

Problém statečnosti v Aristotelově nauce o středu

“…Zavaliy zkoumá vztah homérského a Aristotelova pojetí statečnosti. Podle něj se esenciální prvky obou pojetí značně překrývají, čímž je Aristotelova statečnost mnohem více homérská, než jak se na první pohled jeví a než je snad sám Aristotelés ochoten připustit (Zavaliy 2017). Ať už je tedy Aristotelův záměr vědomý či náhodný, přesto jeho pojetí statečnosti vykazuje nápadné podobnosti s tradiční homérskou představou.…”