How fuzzy-trace theory predicts true and false memories for words, sentences, and narratives.

Reyna, Valerie F.; Corbin, Jonathan C.; Weldon, Rebecca B.; Brainerd, Charles J.

doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.12.003

Cited by 128 publications

(132 citation statements)

References 91 publications

(137 reference statements)

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“…Semantic representations are capable of capturing important structural features of the world at many different levels of abstraction, which allows for rapid and flexible responses to a diverse array of environmental challenges. This preexisting knowledge structure guides ongoing cognition, which usually aids performance, but under some circumstances can lead us into error (1)(2)(3). A striking example is the widely studied DRM (Deese, Roediger, and McDermott) false-memory illusion (4,5).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…However, a mechanistic understanding of how these regions generate false memories is lacking. In particular, although it is known that the semantic relatedness between the different words drives the illusion (3,6,7), little is known about the neural basis of this semantic relatedness. Computational models of semantic cognition propose that concepts are represented by a similarity-based code in an amodal "semantic hub," situated in the apex of the ventral processing stream in the temporal pole (TP) (17,18).…”

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Semantic representations in the temporal pole predict false memories

Chadwick

Anjum

Kumaran

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Recent advances in neuroscience have given us unprecedented insight into the neural mechanisms of false memory, showing that artificial memories can be inserted into the memory cells of the hippocampus in a way that is indistinguishable from true memories. However, this alone is not enough to explain how false memories can arise naturally in the course of our daily lives. Cognitive psychology has demonstrated that many instances of false memory, both in the laboratory and the real world, can be attributed to semantic interference. Whereas previous studies have found that a diverse set of regions show some involvement in semantic false memory, none have revealed the nature of the semantic representations underpinning the phenomenon. Here we use fMRI with representational similarity analysis to search for a neural code consistent with semantic false memory. We find clear evidence that false memories emerge from a similarity-based neural code in the temporal pole, a region that has been called the "semantic hub" of the brain. We further show that each individual has a partially unique semantic code within the temporal pole, and this unique code can predict idiosyncratic patterns of memory errors. Finally, we show that the same neural code can also predict variation in true-memory performance, consistent with an adaptive perspective on false memory. Taken together, our findings reveal the underlying structure of neural representations of semantic knowledge, and how this semantic structure can both enhance and distort our memories.false memory | semantic | temporal pole | fMRI | pattern similarity E ach of us has a vast store of semantic knowledge that we apply to incoming sensory data to extract meaning from the world around us. Semantic representations are capable of capturing important structural features of the world at many different levels of abstraction, which allows for rapid and flexible responses to a diverse array of environmental challenges. This preexisting knowledge structure guides ongoing cognition, which usually aids performance, but under some circumstances can lead us into error (1-3). A striking example is the widely studied DRM (Deese, Roediger, and McDermott) false-memory illusion (4, 5). In a typical DRM task, subjects are asked to memorize a set of words such as "snow," "winter," "ice," and "warm." After a delay, subjects will typically falsely remember having seen the semantically related word "cold." It is widely agreed that this memory illusion is driven by the semantic relatedness between words contained in the encoding list (e.g., "snow") and falsely remembered words that were not actually presented (e.g., "cold"). As such, it is thought that each list item automatically, but weakly, activates the semantically related concept (Fig. 1A). This activation leads to memory confusion, either through a cumulative priming of the related lure (5, 6) or the encoding of the semantic overlap as a "gist" memory (3), resulting in a false memory unless the error is detected by some internal monitoring p...

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Semantic representations in the temporal pole predict false memories

Chadwick

Anjum

Kumaran

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Fuzzy trace theory provides an account of false recollection in the DRM paradigm (termed “phantom recollection” in this theory) that is based on two types of representations being formed during encoding: verbatim and gist-based traces (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016). The general meaning of the studied event is known as a gist trace, while the representation of details of the studied item, including perceptual information such as that manipulated in source memory studies, is known as a verbatim trace.…”

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confidence: 99%

The neurocognitive basis of borrowed context information

O'Neill

Diana

2017

Cortex

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Falsely remembered items can be accompanied by episodic context retrieval. This finding is difficult to explain because there is no episode that binds the remembered item to the experimenter-controlled context features. The current study examines the neural correlates of false context retrieval when the context features can be traced to encoding episodes of semantically-similar items. Our neuroimaging results support a “dissociated source” mechanism for context borrowing in false memory. We found that parahippocampal cortex (PHc) activation, thought to indicate context retrieval, was greater during trials that involved context borrowing (an incorrect, but plausible source decision) than during baseline correct context retrieval. In contrast, hippocampal activation, thought to indicate retrieval of an episodic binding, was stronger during correct source retrieval than during context borrowing. Vivid context retrieval during false recollection experiences was also indicated by increased activation in visual perceptual regions for context borrowing as compared to other incorrect source judgments. The pattern of findings suggests that context borrowing can arise when unusually strong activation of a semantically-related item's contextual features drives relatively weak retrieval of the associated episodic binding with failure to confirm the item information within that binding. This dissociated source retrieval mechanism suggests that context-driven episodic retrieval does not necessarily lead to retrieval of specific item details. That is, source information can be retrieved in the absence of item memory.

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“…This could be viewed as a point in favour of the associative view. However, it has been found that it is possible induce false memories that have a vivid phenomenology, that are characterised as ''mentally re-experienced'', by repeatedly presenting different words with the same meaning (Reyna et al 2016). This suggests that gist representations can be implicated in the production of false memories that involve being able to mentally re-experience; through strengthening the gist representation it is possible to induce participants to falsely believe that they can ''mentally re-experience'' a word.…”

Section: Epistemic Benefits Of Cognitive Mechanisms Underpinning the mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs

Puddifoot

Bortolotti

2018

Philos Stud

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Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating that a person is less reliable than others or their former self. Evidence of memory errors can undermine a person's view of themselves as a competent epistemic agent, but we show that false memory beliefs can be the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms found across the species, which bring substantial epistemic benefits. This challenge to the folk conception is not adequately captured by existing epistemological theories. However, it can be captured by the notion of epistemic innocence, which has previously been deployed to highlight how beliefs which have epistemic costs can also bring significant epistemic benefits. We therefore argue that the notion of epistemic innocence should be expanded so that it applies not just to beliefs but also to cognitive mechanisms.

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How fuzzy-trace theory predicts true and false memories for words, sentences, and narratives.

Cited by 128 publications

References 91 publications

Semantic representations in the temporal pole predict false memories

Semantic representations in the temporal pole predict false memories

The neurocognitive basis of borrowed context information

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs

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