How fundamental is "the fundamental attribution error"?

Harvey, John H.; Town, Jerri P.; Yarkin, Kerry L.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.40.2.346

Cited by 105 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The second bias we examined was the FAE, which is the tendency for people to over-emphasize stable, personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others-referred to as dispositions-while under-emphasizing the role and power of transitory, situational influences on the same behavior (Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981;Mowday, 1981). However, if a behavior is truly caused more by dispositions or other personality variables, then using those dispositions to explain a behavior would not be in error (Gifford & Hine, 1997).…”

Section: Theoretical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit and explicit training in the mitigation of cognitive bias through the use of a serious game

Dunbar

Miller

Adame

et al. 2014

Computers in Human Behavior

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a b s t r a c tHeuristics can interfere with information processing and hinder decision-making when more systematic processes that might lead to better decisions are ignored. Based on the heuristic-systematic model (HSM) of information processing, a serious training game (called MACBETH) was designed to address and mitigate cognitive biases that interfere with the analysis of evidence and the generation of hypotheses. Two biases are the focus of this paper-fundamental attribution error and confirmation bias. The efficacy of the serious game on knowledge and mitigation of biases was examined using an experiment in which participants (N = 703) either played the MACBETH game or watched an instructional video about the biases. Results demonstrate the game to be more effective than the video at mitigating cognitive biases when explicit training methods are combined with repetitive play. Moreover, explicit instruction within the game provided greater familiarity and knowledge of the biases relative to implicit instruction. Suggestions for game development for purposes of enhancing cognitive processing and bias mitigation based on the MACBETH game design are discussed.

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Section: Theoretical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit and explicit training in the mitigation of cognitive bias through the use of a serious game

Dunbar

Miller

Adame

et al. 2014

Computers in Human Behavior

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“…9 6 The actual status of this error as "fundamental" has not gone unquestioned. See Funder (1982b), Harvey, Town, and Yarkin (1981), and Monson and Snyder (1977). 7 A careful reader of the error literature can find occasional disclaimers.…”

Section: -74)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

Funder¹

1987

Psychological Bulletin

796

461

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research on "error" in social judgment has largely supplanted research that addresses accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake." An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. The accuracy of human social judgment is a topic of obvious interest and importance. It is only natural to wonder to what degree the judgments we make of the personalities of ourselves and others might be right or wrong, and to desire to improve our accuracy. Nonpsychologists are often surprised and disappointed, therefore, when they begin to take psychology courses and discover that the field has largely foresworn interest in the accuracy issue. The discipline's early, direct interest in accuracy (e.g., Estes, 1938; Taft, 1955; Vernon, 1933) was all but completely stifled some years ago by the publication of a series of methodological critiques by Cronbach (1955), Hastorf and Bender (1952), and others. As a result, according to one authoritative textbook: The accuracy issue has all but faded from view in recent years, at least for personality judgments. There is not much present interest in questions about whether people are accurate... . There is, in short, almost no concern with normative questions of accuracy. On the other hand, in recent years there has been a renewed interest in how, why, and in what circumstances people are inaccurate. (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979, p. 224; see also Cook, 1984)' Specifically, the psychology of social judgment has been dominated in recent years by a flood of research on the subject of "error." Studies of error appear in the literature at a prodigious rate, are disproportionately likely to be cited (Christensen-Sza

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“…Utilizing the fundamental attribution error (FAE, for review, see Tetlock, 1985;Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981) Upon completion of the writing task, participants completed the three-item state selfesteem scale (=.87) and Paulhus's (1984) BIDR, assessing both self-deceptive enhancement (=.76) and impression management (=.90).…”

Section: Study 4: Ethical Dissonance or Salience Of Ethicalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The pot calling the kettle black: Distancing response to ethical dissonance.

Barkan

Ayal

Gino

et al. 2012

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

139

115

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Six studies demonstrate the -pot calling the kettle black‖ phenomenon whereby people are guilty of the very fault they identify in others. Recalling an undeniable ethical failure, people experience ethical dissonance between their moral values and their behavioral misconduct.Our findings indicate that to reduce ethical dissonance, individuals use a double-distancing mechanism. Using an overcompensating ethical code, they judge others more harshly and present themselves as more virtuous and ethical (Studies 1, 2, 3). We show this mechanism is exclusive for ethical dissonance and is not triggered by salience of ethicality (Study 4), general sense of personal failure, or ethically-neutral cognitive dissonance (Study 5). Finally, it is characterized by some boundary conditions (Study 6). We discuss the theoretical contribution of this work to research on moral regulation and ethical behavior.

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How fundamental is "the fundamental attribution error"?

Cited by 105 publications

References 17 publications

Implicit and explicit training in the mitigation of cognitive bias through the use of a serious game

Implicit and explicit training in the mitigation of cognitive bias through the use of a serious game

Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment.

The pot calling the kettle black: Distancing response to ethical dissonance.

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