2015
DOI: 10.20955/r.2015.303-22
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How Effective Is Central Bank Forward Guidance?

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Cited by 14 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
(31 reference statements)
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“…On the other hand, Filardo and Hofmann (2014) find that forward-guidance, as implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England during the latter period seems to have lowered the volatility of near-term expectations of future policy rates, but not the level of the expected interest rates. Further, Kool and Thornton (2015) only provide weak evidence that forward-guidance may have improved the market participants ability to forecast short-term interest rates over short horizons in New Zealand, Norway and Sweden in the post-financial crisis period, and no support for this hypothesis in the United States.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 84%
“…On the other hand, Filardo and Hofmann (2014) find that forward-guidance, as implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England during the latter period seems to have lowered the volatility of near-term expectations of future policy rates, but not the level of the expected interest rates. Further, Kool and Thornton (2015) only provide weak evidence that forward-guidance may have improved the market participants ability to forecast short-term interest rates over short horizons in New Zealand, Norway and Sweden in the post-financial crisis period, and no support for this hypothesis in the United States.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 84%
“…A natural concern is whether forward guidance statements have had a perceptible impact on expectations. Kool and Thornton (2012) argue that they have not, at least not in the context of monetary policy in four leading OECD economies. On the other side, Campbell et al (2012) argue that they did in the United States when viewed over a longer sample period .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…There is a rapidly growing body of academic evidence which suggests that central bank communication embodies a compelling monetary policy instrument (see for example, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), Campbell et al (2012), Moessner (2013), and Swanson and Williams (2014) for the US; Moessner and Nelson (2008) and Detmers and Nautz (2012) for New Zealand; Chehal and Trehan (2009) and He (2010) for Canada; Andersson and Hofmann (2009) for Sweden, Norway and New Zealand; and Kool and Thornton (2015) for Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and the United States). However, as noted by Haldane and McMahon (2018), most studies focus primarily on the effect of central bank communication on expectations reflected from financial instruments (e.g., asset prices) and forecasting professionals.…”
Section: Empirical Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%