How Do We Acquire Parental Rights?

Millum, Joseph

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract20103615

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…My account is also intended to be neutral with respect to the question of how many parents a child can have, and assumes a rolebased and 'contribution' account of what makes a parent and what grounds parenting rights as well as responsibilities. Thus my account aligns with those proposed and defended by Millum (2008Millum ( , 2010 and Hannan & Vernon (2008). 3 Goodin's influential book on vulnerability proposed the following as an initial characterization: "[S]omething is 'vulnerable' if it 'may be wounded', either literally or figuratively; it is 'susceptible of injury, no proof against weapon, criticism, etc.'.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 70%

Parental vulnerability

Lotz

2017

Etikk Praksis - Nord J Appl Ethics

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Increasing philosophical attention has recently focused on questions of the nature of vulnerability, and of the implications of recognizing and responding to vulnerability in human agents and subjects. Within that field of interest, explorations and analyses of the specific vulnerability of children have raised many interesting questions regarding the nature of childhood and the vulnerability-responsive obligations of parents. By contrast, there has been no philosophical recognition or discussion of parental vulnerability within the parent-child relationship. In this paper I seek to address that theoretical gap, exploring the distinct ways in which parents are vulnerable qua parents, as well as some of the normative implications that follow from a recognition of that vulnerability. These implications include claims of a vulnerability-based foundation for extensive parental authority over children, and the significant role of expanded social structures and mechanisms to more adequately support the parenting of our children.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 70%

Parental vulnerability

Lotz

2017

Etikk Praksis - Nord J Appl Ethics

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“…For instance, might procreators have a natural obligation to care for their children, because they have tacitly consented to it by their actions, 46 or because they are responsible for the existence of their offspring's vulnerable state? 47 Might procreators have a natural claim on their offspring, not as their property, but nonetheless as something in which they have invested their labor 48 or love? 49 Maybe generation does, after all, have moral signifi cance in the assignment of parental rights, if not in determining their content.…”

Section: Who Governs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Creation and Authority: The Natural Law Foundations of Locke's Account of Parental Authority

Franklin‐Hall

2012

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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“…As Joseph Millum argues, individuals acquire parental rights in light of performing the relevant work. He proposes the following investment principle to explain why procreators incur parental rights: ‘Ceteris paribus, the extent of an agent’s stake in an object is proportional to the amount of appropriate work he or she has put into that object’ (p 112) 14. To see why this formulation of the account is still problematic, let us imagine that the process for prospective parents to use ectogenesis is similar to the application process that is currently in place for adoption.…”

Section: The Moral Basis Of Parental Rights and Responsibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Willing mothers: ectogenesis and the role of gestational motherhood

Kennedy

2020

J Med Ethics

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While artificial womb technology (ectogenesis) is currently being studied for the purpose of improving neonatal care, I contend that this technology ought to be pursued as a means to address the unprecedented rate of unintended pregnancies. But ectogenesis, alongside other emerging reproductive technologies, is problematic insofar as it threatens to disrupt the natural link between procreation and parenthood that is normally thought to generate rights and responsibilities for biological parents. I argue that there remains only one potentially viable account of parenthood: the voluntarist account, which construes parental rights as robust moral obligations that must be voluntarily undertaken. The problem is that this account mistakenly presumes a patriarchal divide between procreation and parenthood. I propose a reframing of procreation and parenthood from a feminist perspective that recognises gestational motherhood as involving robust moral obligations that ought to be voluntarily undertaken. If this were the case, all gestational mothers would be, by definition, willing mothers. To make this happen I argue that ectogenesis technology must be a widely available reproductive option.

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How Do We Acquire Parental Rights?

Cited by 10 publications

References 1 publication

Parental vulnerability

Parental vulnerability

Creation and Authority: The Natural Law Foundations of Locke's Account of Parental Authority

Willing mothers: ectogenesis and the role of gestational motherhood

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