How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?

Kiesewetter, Benjamin; Gertken, Jan

doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1745252

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

2020

DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1745252

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How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?

Benjamin Kiesewetter

Jan Gertken

Abstract: Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and (iii) present an alternative, less liberal transmission principle… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications

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“…Defenses of or reliance upon liberal transmission principles can be found inRaz (2005),Bedke (2009),Way (2012),Schroeder (2007Schroeder ( , 2009, andKolodny (2018). See alsoKiesewetter and Gertken (2021) for discussion.…”

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An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

Steglich‐Petersen

2022

Philosophical Books

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Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow, can depend not only on the person's evidence, but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as "pragmatic encroachment" on knowledge and rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism.The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. In §2, I introduce the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment. In §3, I introduce some of the difficulties facing explanations of pragmatic encroachment by discussing one of the main proposals for such an explanation, namely that of Mark Schroeder. In §4, I introduce my transmission-based version of epistemic instrumentalism, that I rely on to explain pragmatic encroachment in §5, where I also show how this explanation avoids the difficulties faced by Schroeder's account, and avoids commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism. §6 is a brief summary and conclusion. Pragmatic EncroachmentWe can introduce the phenomenon of pragmatic encroachment by considering the sort of cases that are often taken to motivate it. 3 Here is a set of cases from Schroeder (2012a: 266-7), adapted from Stanley (2005) and DeRose (1992). Consider first Low Stakes: Low Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Hannah remembers the bank being open on Saturday morning a few weeks ago, so she says, 'Fortunately, it will be open tomorrow, so we can just come back.' In fact, Hannah is right -the bank will be open on Saturday. Many philosophers share the intuition that Hannah's belief that the bank will be open could plausibly be considered epistemically rational. Her memory of seeing the bank being open a few weeks ago (coupled with relevant background knowledge) seems sufficient epistemic reason for her to believe that the bank will be open. 4 But contrast now Low Stakes with High Stakes: High Stakes: Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since their mortgage payment is due on Sunday, they have very little in their account, and they are on the brink3 Not all proponents of pragmatic encroachment base their arguments primarily on intuitions about cases such as these. For example, Fantl & McGrath (2007; argue that pragmatic encroachment follows from fallibilism about knowledge and ...

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An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

Steglich‐Petersen

2022

Philosophical Books

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Instrumental Needs: A Relational Account

Stabell

2024

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for x depends on the end for which x is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should such transmission be understood, and how can we assess the amount or degree of significance being transmitted in particular cases? The Relational Account (RA) combines work on normative transmission principles and the strength of reasons in order to clarify these issues. RA, it is argued, both (1) improves the instrumental view on need and (2) can be used to analyze and assess a large range of needs and arguments from need – including ‘basic needs’, which some argue require non-instrumental explanation. While the paper develops an instrumental view, the analysis of the normativity of the needs-end relation will also be helpful for clarifying instrumental relations between different kinds of need in non-instrumentalist theories – such as relations between ‘absolute’ and intermediate needs.

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The Primacy of the Practical

Brunero

2024

Can. J. of Philosophy

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According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between ψ-ing and ϕ-ing), we can derive reasons to intend to ϕ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between intending to ϕ and ϕ-ing). After providing some defense of Instrumentalism, I turn to two recent, important arguments for the Intention-First theory advanced by McHugh and Way, and I argue that neither of them succeed. I conclude that we should reject the Intention-First theory and that we have grounds for optimism about the Action-First theory.

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How Do Reasons Transmit to Non-Necessary Means?

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment

Instrumental Needs: A Relational Account

The Primacy of the Practical

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