How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome

Sampat, Bhaven N.; Williams, Heidi

doi:10.3386/w21666

Cited by 100 publications

(170 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…In order to estimate the causal relationship, we use variation in leniency across patent examiners as a source of exogenous variation in granted patents. Patent examiner leniency has been recently used as an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of patents on subsequent cumulative innovation (Sampat and Williams, 2015) and on venture capitalbacked startup success (Gaulé, 2015;Farre-Mensa et al, 2017). The validity of this instrument is supported by interviews with employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) regarding the allocation of patent applications to examiners (Cockburn et al, 2003;Lemley and Sampat, 2012), as well as by our own exogeneity tests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…This instrument was first proposed by Sampat and Williams (2015) based on the work of Lemley and Sampat (2012) and Cockburn et al (2003) on the processes and outcomes of patent examination at the USPTO. We next describe this process to illustrate the rationale for the instrument.…”

Section: Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(1) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach (see Gaulé, 2015;Sampat and Williams, 2015;Farre-Mensa et al, 2017). This instrument was first proposed by Sampat and Williams (2015) based on the work of Lemley and Sampat (2012) and Cockburn et al (2003) on the processes and outcomes of patent examination at the USPTO.…”

Section: Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent research on the impact of patents on subsequent innovation is also inconclusive. While Galasso and Schankerman (2015) provide evidence of substantial increases in citations of patents that are invalidated by courts, Sampat and Williams (2015) show that patents on genes do not hinder subsequent related innovations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility

2017

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This paper investigates the effect of obtaining a patent on the mobility of employee inventors who are at the beginning of their careers. We suggest that patents make human capital more specific to the employer. As a result, we expect that patenting leads to lower levels of mobility. We draw on U.S. patent application data for the period 2001-2012 to analyze this issue. Using average examiner leniency as an exogenous source of variation in granted patents, we find that one additional patent granted decreases inventor mobility by approximately 25 percent. The estimated negative effect is nearly twice as large for discrete technologies (chemicals and pharmaceuticals) for which patent effectiveness is greater. The effect is also more pronounced in cases where the inventor's knowledge can be independently transferred (e.g., inventors with few co-authors) and for moves concerning technologically similar employers. The results have implications for the effect of patents on knowledge diffusion. ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the effect of obtaining a patent on the mobility of employee inventors who are at the beginning of their careers. We suggest that patents make human capital more specific to the employer. As a result, we expect that patenting leads to lower levels of mobility. We draw on U.S. patent application data for the period 2001-2012 to analyze this issue. Using average examiner leniency as an exogenous source of variation in granted patents, we find that one additional patent granted decreases inventor mobility by approximately 25 percent. The estimated negative effect is nearly twice as large for discrete technologies (chemicals and pharmaceuticals) for which patent effectiveness is greater. The effect is also more pronounced in cases where the inventor's knowledge can be independently transferred (e.g., inventors with few co-authors) and for moves concerning technologically similar employers. The results have implications for the effect of patents on knowledge diffusion.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility

2017

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“…3 While our study looks mainly at patents in the electronics and computer industry, Sampat and Williams (2015) consider gene patents and find no effect on follow-on research. The size of our measured effects is consistent with that reported by other studies such as Murray and Stern (2007) and Moser and Voena (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree

et al. 2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study the 1956 consent decree against the Bell System to investigate whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for innovation and if so, whether compulsory licensing can provide an effective remedy. The consent decree settled an antitrust lawsuit that charged Bell with having foreclosed the market for telecommunications equipment. The decree forced Bell to license all its existing patents royalty-free. The compulsory licensing increased follow-on innovation building on Bell patents by 17%. This effect is driven mainly by young and small companies. Yet, innovation increased only outside the telecommunications equipment industry, suggesting that compulsory licensing without structural remedies is ineffective in ending market foreclosure. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: O300, O330, O340, K210, L400.

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The Track One Pilot Program: Who benefits from prioritized patent examination?

Kuhn

Teodorescu

2020

Strategic Entrepreneurship

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Research Summary Speed is often critical for successful commercialization of a new technology, and patents help entrepreneurs secure funding, enter the market, and avoid expropriation of their ideas. In this article, we employ a recent change to U.S. patent law—the introduction of an elective program accelerating patent examination—to investigate the role of patent examination speed in strategic entrepreneurship. We find that small firms with limited patent portfolios are the most likely to expedite their patent applications. Moreover, accelerated patents are cited and litigated at higher rates than other patents, and these outcomes are more sensitive to exogenous changes to patent scope. Our results suggest that providing the option to accelerate patent examination may help increase incentives for innovation by strategic entrepreneurs. Managerial Summary Patents are essential to high‐tech businesses, helping them to secure funding and exclude competitors from the marketplace. We evaluate a USPTO pilot program that allowed patent applicants to accelerate patent examination, yielding a patent in less than 1 year when typically 3 or more years are required. We find that entrepreneurs are more likely to use the program than large firms. Moreover, patents examined under the program tend to be strategically important. They are litigated and cited at higher rates than other patents, and the scope of the patents' claims plays a key role in these outcomes. Collectively our results suggest that multi‐track patent examination programs are likely to have a positive effect on generating new ideas, increasing value capture for entrepreneurs, and facilitating the growth of small businesses. Our results also suggest that the USPTO has implemented the program successfully by accelerating examination without sacrificing quality.

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How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome

Cited by 100 publications

References 49 publications

The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility

The Effect of Patent Protection on Inventor Mobility

How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree

The Track One Pilot Program: Who benefits from prioritized patent examination?

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