How Do Mental Processes Preserve Truth? Husserl’s Discovery of the Computational Theory of Mind

Lopes, Jesse

doi:10.1007/s10743-019-09257-3

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Recently the effort to sympathetically link Husserl to classical AI has been revitalized by Lopes (2020Lopes ( , 2022. In fact, Lopes argues that Husserl actually discovered the computational theory of mind.…”

Section: Pluralist Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These texts focus on such topics as formal grammar and the constitution of mathematics and logic. 19 Analyses of the ideas in these texts using symbolic computational theories are in (Lopes, 2020(Lopes, , 2022. Of course, Husserl did not think he was contradicting himself in conducting these different studies, so we have historical evidence that phenomenology can be pursued in a pluralist framework.…”

Section: Pluralist Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes

Yoshimi

2023

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.

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Section: Pluralist Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Pluralist Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes

Yoshimi

2023

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…For "probability cannot wrestle with truth" on pain of psychologism (1975, 75/2001, 48). But, as we have just learned, our own thoughtmachine can (and does) wrestle with truth (Lopes, 2020). It might be interesting to note that Husserl's criticism would apply just as much to Yoshimi's Husserlian Phenomenology (2016), which is much concerned with attaching Husserl to the psychologistic paradigm of Bayes-like belief update and dynamical systems theory more generally.…”

Section: Husserl's Denkmaschinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, Husserl's descriptions of intentionality can be more than "linked" to the computational theory. This is because Husserl had earlier formulated the presentday conception of the computational theory of mind, as theoretically distinct from associationism, in 1891 (Lopes, 2020). What is more, he discusses this theory, and its relation to the subsequent Logical Investigations, in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, which serves as a sort of introduction and foundation to the work as a whole.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations?

Lopes¹

2022

Husserl Stud

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τότε ἐπιστάµεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶµεν -Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (71b31-2). IntroductionEver since Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall presented Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (1982), the question of the relation of phenomenology to cognitive science has been, if not answered, at least discussed. Dreyfus tried to answer this question in terms of the work of Jerry Fodor. From a Husserlian "point of view," Dreyfus contended, "Fodor is rediscovering a very important discipline: the phenomenological theory of cognition, which Hume and Kant saw dimly and which Husserl brought into its own" ( 15). This answer, however, proved to be very unpopular (though see Pokropski 2020), and was immediately rejected by Husserlians, both before (McIntyre, 1986) and after (Brown, 1990; Woodruff Smith, 1995, 342) the discovery of the potential of neural networks as an explanatory apparatus for cognitive phenomena (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986;Smolensky, 1991).In light of the newfound promise of multilayer networks, and without heeding the warnings of the rediscoverer of phenomenological cognition (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988), the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences was born. The guiding framework for the journal was established by the work of Varela, Thompson, and

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On the psychologism of neurophenomenology

Lopes

2021

Phenom Cogn Sci

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How Do Mental Processes Preserve Truth? Husserl’s Discovery of the Computational Theory of Mind

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes

Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes

Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations?

On the psychologism of neurophenomenology

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