How do institutions affect structural unemployment in times of crises?

Furceri, Davide; Mourougane, Annabelle

doi:10.2298/pan1204393f

Cited by 30 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Another similar result comes from a paper by Furceri and Mourougane (2009), who study the impact of economic crises on the structural unemployment rate in a panel of 30 OECD countries from 1970 to 2008. They find that while structural unemployment was relatively untouched by crises in countries with flexible labor and product markets, some sizeable increases could be observed in countries with rigid labor and product markets.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 56%

Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance around the World

Feldmann

2012

Labour

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Using annual data on 80 countries for 1980–2007 and a new indicator of product market regulation, this paper studies the effects of product market regulation on labor market performance among the total population as well as among two important groups of labor market outsiders: women and youth. It finds that stricter regulation is likely to both increase the unemployment rate and decrease the employment rate. The magnitude of the estimated effects is substantial. There are above‐average effects on both groups of outsiders, with the effects being particularly strong on youth. The results are robust to variations in specification.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 56%

Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance around the World

Feldmann

2012

Labour

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“…Stringent legislation seems to dampen the unemployment-increasing effect in the short term in case of macroeconomic shocks, but prolongs the period required for unemployment to return to its previous level. Evaluating the effects of employment protection legislation on structural unemployment in economic downturns, Furceri and Mourougane (2009) find that crises increase structural unemployment in countries with above average stringency in employment protection.…”

Section: Cross-country Studies: Aggregate Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Employment Consequences of Employment Protection Legislation

Skedinger

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Employment Consequences of Employment Protection LegislationPer Skedinger

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“…111 In a comparable context, Cerra and Saxena (2009) and Furceri and Mourougane (2009a;2009b) apply an autoregressive estimation technique to analyse the effects of financial crises on GDP growth. However, as so-called impulse-response functions are calculated recursively, this approach has been criticised for being sensitive to small specification or estimation errors that always exist in practice.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Sharing of Macroeconomic Risk

Ahrend

Arnold

Moeser

2011

OECD Economics Department Working Papers

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JT03304774This paper addresses the often neglected question of how macroeconomic risk is shared across and within economies, and identifies reforms that could contribute towards achieving more desirable risksharing outcomes. For risk-sharing across countries, the paper discusses possibilities for international insurance as well as shock-spreading and risk-mitigating policies. Within countries, it assesses the possibilities for individuals to protect their wealth, labour and capital income against various forms of macroeconomic risk and discusses the desirable boundaries between private and government-sponsored risk-sharing institutions. The paper then presents new empirical and model-based evidence about how the short-term impact of selected macroeconomic shocks (including financial crises) is shared across different groups of agents, and analyses how such distributional effects are shaped by differences in institutions. For example, individuals on low incomes, and especially young people, seem in general to lose most from adverse macroeconomic shocks. Also, it appears that across countries two broad types of institutions can be identified that facilitate risk sharing between high and low income earners, namely "social protection" and "reallocation-facilitating" institutions. Based on countries' reliance on these types of institutions, four broad "models" of risk sharing are identified across the OECD and the BRIICS.JEL Codes: D31; D63; E60; F55; G22; H11; I38

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How do institutions affect structural unemployment in times of crises?

Cited by 30 publications

References 7 publications

Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance around the World

Product Market Regulation and Labor Market Performance around the World

Employment Consequences of Employment Protection Legislation

The Sharing of Macroeconomic Risk

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