How Children Reason about Gains and Losses: Framing Effects in Judgement and Choice

Abstract

Three experiments considered how the positive or negative framing of decisions affects children’s EV (expected value) judgements and choices. In Experiment 1, 6- and 9-year-olds chose between a sure gain and a gamble or between a sure loss and a gamble, all with the same EV. Children preferred the sure thing more in the positive than negative frame, as also appears for adults. In Experiment 2, both frames involved potential losses. In their judgements, 6- and 9-year-olds used the normative multiplication rule for integrating risk and amount at risk, with minor frame differences, but when choosing between the same options, they were risk-averse in the save, risk-seeking in the loss frame. In Experiment 3, 5-year-olds used multiplication for saves, with an irregular pattern for losses. Overall, children’s judgements conform closely to normativity. At the same time, children’s choices, like adults’, show non-normative framing effects. This décalage may reflect the involvement of more intuitive processes in judgement than choice.

Judgment and decision making in young children

“…While susceptibility to frame differences does not change much developmentally, children seem somewhat more risk-seeking than adults in equivalent tasks (Harbaugh et al, 2002;Levin and Hart, 2003;Levin et al 2007a;Reyna and Ellis, 1994;but see Schlottmann and Tring 2005), consistent with popular opinion. Children's risk attitudes -like adults' -depend on the level of risk, but the direction of this effect varies with task specifics (Harbaugh et al, 2002;Schlottmann and Tring, 2005). Schlottmann and Tring (2005) also showed that frame differences were strong in standard choice tasks, but minimal (albeit in the same direction) in EV judgements for each choice option, consistent with findings, discussed earlier, of more advanced judgement than choice strategies.…”

“…For adults, reasoning about losses seems more demanding, involving anticipated regret (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002) and induced conflict (Lopes, 1987). In line with this, children make more advanced EV choices (Levin et al, 2007b) and judgements (Schlottmann and Tring, 2005) for gains.…”

“…This appears reliably for area judgement (e.g., Anderson and Cuneo, 1978;Wilkening, 1979), time and velocity judgement (Wilkening, 1981), and numerosity judgement (Cuneo, 1982). Fanning, however, appears equally reliably in EV tasks (Anderson, 1980;Schlottmann and Anderson, 1994;Schlottmann, 2001;Schlottmann and Tring, 2005;Bayless and Schlottmann, in press), including in a study with four-year-olds (Schlottmann and Christoferou, in preparation), well before instruction with probabilities in school.…”

“…Framing studies largely agree that children are more risk-seeking for losses than gains, just like adults (Harbaugh et al, 2002;Levin and Hart, 2003;Levin, Hart, Weller and Harshman, 2007a;Schlottmann and Tring, 2005; but see Reyna and Ellis, 1994;Levin et al, 2007b). While susceptibility to frame differences does not change much developmentally, children seem somewhat more risk-seeking than adults in equivalent tasks (Harbaugh et al, 2002;Levin and Hart, 2003;Levin et al 2007a;Reyna and Ellis, 1994;but see Schlottmann and Tring 2005), consistent with popular opinion.…”

Is It Crucial to Use Information-Based Theory in Explaining Attitude towards Change?

“…Interestingly, one may be influenced by information framing. This fact is considered as evidence that there is an irrationality side in human mind when one is making a decision (Mandel, 2014;Schlottmann & Tring, 2005). There some theories that may be adopted to explain why one is influenced by information framing.…”