How chance explains

Abstract

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Moral Necessitism and Scientific Contingentism

“…Similarly, the concerns about explanation and understanding from section 2.3.1 remain. For example, the view has problems with the idea that our understanding of the badness of ϕ should not derive from the primitive relation N. When the meta-explainer view is developed in literature on scientific laws (Skow, 2016;Hicks, 2020;Hicks and Wilson, 2023) it comes with a view that understanding of a proposition P derives not just from the facts that explain P, but from the facts that explain what explains P. (The thought being that it is obvious that the scientific laws, e.g. Newton's laws, are part of what we need to understand why e.g.…”