How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

Blanckenburg, Korbinian von; Geist, Alexander

doi:10.1007/s11294-009-9235-6

Cited by 19 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…Lorenz (2008) used the CFD-Concept to describe qualitative collusive characteristics. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) enhanced his findings to the System of Cartel Markers (SCM). In contrast to previous IO research SCM allows simultaneous analysis of different testable cartel markers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

Blanckenburg

Geist

2010

Eur J Law Econ

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

Blanckenburg

Geist

2010

Eur J Law Econ

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“…The variance was even higher as compared to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. Blanckenburg and Geist (2009) However, a robust screening needs adequate data and methods.…”

Section: Requirement Of Screening Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Market Screening Model for Price Inconstancies: Empirical Evidence from German Electricity Markets

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this paper, we develop a market screening model to detect inconstancies in price changes. Although there is a long history of industrial organization research of collusion, price setting behavior, and conduct -a robust model to detect structural changes in market structure was missing so far. Our non-parametric approach closes this gap and can be used as a tentative warning system for emerging collusions. Based on the theoretical and empirical results from previous research, we describe requirements of screenings, develop a model, and illustrate our approach with a short market simulation. Finally, we apply the model to the German electricity market. According to our results, between 2001 and 2011 energy suppliers appear to be successful in controlling the market price for several phases. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…The variance was even higher as compared with the pre‐ and post‐cartel periods. Blanckenburg and Geist () find a significant lower variance in price changes for the cartel period of the German cement industry 1981–2001, compared with the pre‐ and post‐cartel periods.…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases

Blanckenburg

Geist

Kholodilin

2012

German Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and noncollusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.

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How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

Abstract: Competition policy, Workability of markets, Industry studies, L10, L60,

Cited by 19 publications

References 20 publications

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

A Market Screening Model for Price Inconstancies: Empirical Evidence from German Electricity Markets

The Influence of Collusion on Price Changes: New Evidence from Major Cartel Cases

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