2014
DOI: 10.1111/lsi.12035
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How Bureaucracies Listen to Courts: Bureaucratized Calculations and European Law

Abstract: The European Court of Justice, and courts in general, were key actors in the creation of the European Union (EU). However, they cannot change major policy without political supporters to lobby and litigate for implementation. We argue that part of the resolution of this apparent paradox comes from complementing existing work on the activities of EU courts and litigants with a focus on a third actor: implementing bureaucracies, whose effect on law and politics has not been a focus of studies of EU legal develop… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 70 publications
(102 reference statements)
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“…In the context of federalism and territorial politics, this means that contained compliance by governments with court decisions can be quite common. The null hypothesis would be that a court decision against a regional government will have an impact largely proportional to the size of the supportive coalition behind that change (Greer and Martín de Almagro Iniesta 2013;Epp 2009;Canon and Johnson 1999;McCann 1994). Losers make strategic calculations about how to respond to decisions and might opt for contained compliance or efforts to change the law.…”
Section: Coordination: Courts and The Judiciarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the context of federalism and territorial politics, this means that contained compliance by governments with court decisions can be quite common. The null hypothesis would be that a court decision against a regional government will have an impact largely proportional to the size of the supportive coalition behind that change (Greer and Martín de Almagro Iniesta 2013;Epp 2009;Canon and Johnson 1999;McCann 1994). Losers make strategic calculations about how to respond to decisions and might opt for contained compliance or efforts to change the law.…”
Section: Coordination: Courts and The Judiciarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A rational analysis of the benefits and, more importantly, the costs associated with compliance seems to dominate actors' attitudes towards CJEU case law (Conant, 2002;Blauberger, 2014;Greer and Martín de Almagro Iniesta, 2014). According to this logic, governments comply with CJEU rulings after rationally weighing the instrumental costs of compliance against the potential costs of non-compliance (Beach, 2005, p. 114).…”
Section: State Of the Art And Empirical Evidence From Germany And Francementioning
confidence: 99%