How Are Social Identities Linked to Self-Conception and Intergroup Orientation? The Moderating Effect of Implicit Theories.

Abstract

Social identity approaches assume that social identification affects both self-conception and intergroup orientation. The authors contend that such social identification effects are accentuated when people hold a fixed view of human character and attribute immutable dispositions to social groups. To these individuals, social identities are immutable, concrete entities capable of guiding self-conception and intergroup orientation. Social identification effects are attenuated when people hold a malleable view of human character and thus do not view social identities as fixed, concrete entities. The authors tested and found support for this contention in three studies that were conducted in the context of the Hong Kong 1997 political transition, and discussed the findings in terms of their implications for self-conceptions and the meaning of social identification.

Predicting Intergroup Bias: The Interactive Effects of Implicit Theory and Social Identity

“…Although research has shown consistent effects of social categorization on intergroup perceptions, such effects could be moderated by people's implicit assumptions about the malleability of human character (Hong et al, 2003;. The present research sought to examine how people's basic assumptions (implicit theories) of the malleability of human character might moderate the effects of social categorization on biases in intergroup perceptions.…”

Beyond nature and nurture: The influence of lay gender theories on self-stereotyping

“…We followed the theoretical tradition of the implicit theories of human attributes to view people as ''naı¨ve scientists'' (Heider, 1958), who hold theories about the nature of social groups and use the theories to guide their perceptions of these social groups, including their own in-group. For instance, previous research has shown that people who endorse an entity theory of personality (i.e., personality attributes are fixed and unalterable), in comparison to those who endorse an incremental theory of personality (i.e., personality attributes are malleable), were more likely to endorse stereotypes of social groups (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), hold prejudiced attitudes toward a maligned out-group (Hong et al, 2004), and use social identity to guide important aspects of their self (Hong et al, 2003). Given these findings, women's lay theories about gender may also have implications for their adherence to gender-typed characteristics.…”

Not Just for Stereotyping Anymore

“…In the essentialism and nonessentialism conditions, we manipulated beliefs about racial essentialism by asking participants to read an article that vividly described fictitious scientific research supporting either racial essentialist or nonessentialist beliefs, respectively (Chiu et al, 1997;Hong et al, 2003;No et al, 2008). No et al (2008) established the effectiveness of these articles in activating racial essentialism or nonessentialism mind-sets: In their study, participants who read the essentialist article reported significantly greater agreement with essentialist views of race than did participants who read the nonessentialist article.…”

“…Of course, we did not design the crosssectional pilot study to test the causal relationship between essentialism and creativity. In our subsequent experiments, we utilized the fact that, like other lay theories (e.g., Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997;Hong et al, 2003), beliefs about racial essentialism are a part of people's declarative knowledge and, therefore, follow the principles of knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996): They can be activated by experimental manipulation (No et al, 2008). This approach capitalizes on the tenet that although there are chronic differences in people's endorsement of racial essentialism, the temporary accessibility of racial essentialist beliefs can be heightened or dampened after reading persuasive arguments that respectively support or undermine those beliefs.…”