How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

Abstract

An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and – via internal simulation – of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.

A hexapod walker using a heterarchical architecture for action selection

“…Recently, these authors have argued that even higher-level properties as are intention, (bottom–up and top–down) attention, volition as well as some aspects of consciousness can be attributed to a network based on this architecture. Interestingly, these properties are not explicitly implemented but appear as emergent properties of the network (Cruse and Schilling, 2013). …”

ReaCog, a Minimal Cognitive Controller Based on Recruitment of Reactive Systems

“…Above, we had already used one such higher level term, attention. It has been argued (Cruse and Schilling, 2013 , 2015 ) that further emergent properties as are intentions and emotions might be attributed to a system as reaCog, too, at least on the functional level. When adding some further procedures, reaCog might even be equipped with basic aspects required for Access Consciousness as well as Reflexive Consciousness (Cruse and Schilling, 2013 , 2015 ).…”

“…Other aspects would require further extension: Langley et al's issues (10)–(12) refer to the ability to use (verbal) symbols, a property not given in reaCog. However, a way has been sketched how this might be possible (for a first step toward this property see (Schilling and Spranger, 2010 ; Cruse and Schilling, 2013 ; Schilling and Narayanan, 2013 ), based on ideas of Steels and Belpaeme ( 2005 ) and Narayanan ( 1999 ).…”

“…This property is not realized in reaCog and may also depend on the ability to apply symbolic knowledge. Issue (14), the property of cognitive systems to “confront the interactions between body and mind” addresses the property of having phenomenal experience, and is not found in reaCog, too (for a discussion of this matter see Cruse and Schilling, 2013 , 2015 ). In summary, a number of emergent properties can be observed in reaCog, including Langley et al's issues (1)–(7).…”

“…This simple network shows basic properties required for a cognitive system and can be used as a scaffold for later introduction of further properties. In addition, capabilities like showing attention or emotions, might be found as properties emerging from such an architecture as discussed in Cruse and Schilling ( 2013 ).…”